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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL 
Section I. INTRODUCTION 
1-1. Purpose 
This manual sets forth doctrine and establishes 
procedures :for the management, planning, and 
collection of information which, upon evaluation 
and production into intelligence, is reported and 
disseminated as Army technical intelligence. It 
provides guidance for commanders, staff officers, 
and other personnel and units,· and aids in under-
standing the concept and role of technical intelli-
gence in the overall intelUgence requirements of · 
the commander. 
1-2. Scape 
a. The contents of this manual deal primarily 
with technical intelligence organizations and the 
objectives and functions of technical intelligence 
operations. The manual outlines procedures and 
establishes broad principles regarding the role of 
military intelligence units engaged in technical in-
teUigence activities. In addition, it identifies those 
sources and agencies available to assist in accom-
plishing the technical intelligence requirements of 
the commander. Engineer topographic and terrain 
· intelligence are discussed in FM 5-30 and FM 
30-10; consequently, they are not included within 
the scope of this manual. 
b. The material presented herein is applicable 
to general war, limited war, and cold war situa.. 
tions. Such situations include stability operations, 
nuclear and nonnuclear warfare enviromnents, 
and employment of chemical agents/munitions 
and nuclear weapons. Protection from chemical 
and biological agents and radioactive fallout is 
also included. 
e. This manual is in consonance with the follow-
ing international standardization agreements, 
which are identified by type of agreement and 
number at the beginning of each appropriate · 
chapter and appendix in the manual : 
Title 
Handling and RePQrt-
ing of Captured 
Enemy . Equipment 
and Documents ----
Nomenclature fo:r So-
viet Bloc Army 
Weapons and Equip-
ment --------------
NATO CENTO SEATO ABOA 
STANAG STANAG SEASTAG SOLOG 
2084 2084 2084 94 
2097 2097 
1-3. Recommended Chan1es 
Users of this manual are encouraged to submit 
recommendations to improve its clarity ·or 
accuracy. Comments should be keyed to the spe-
cific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which 
the change is recommended. Reasons should be 
provided for each comment to insure understand-
ing and complete evaluation. Comments should be 
prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended 
Changes to Publications) and forwarded direct to 
the Commanding Officer, US Army Combat Devel-
opments Command Intelligence Agency, Fort Hu-
achuca, Arizona 85613. Originators of proposed 
changes constituting significant modification of 
approved Army doctrine may send an information 
copy, through command channels, to the Com-
manding General, USACDC, Fort Belvoir, Vir-
ginia 22060. This action will facilitate review and 
followup. 
1-4. Deflnitiens 
a. For definition of terms used see AR 810-25. 
b. The relationship of intelligence and technical 
intelligence is set forth below: 
(1) Intelligence is the product resulting from 
the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, 
and interpretation of all information concerning 
one or more aspects of foreign countries or areas 
which are immediately or potentially significant 
to the development and execution of military 
plans, policies, operations, and development of 
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military equipment. Technical intelligence, which 
is one aspect of military intelligence, plays a vital 
role in the tactical and strategic intelligence pic-
ture and therefore must be .considered as part of 
an overall integrated intelligence effort. 
(2) Technical intelligence is that intelligence 
concerning for~ign technological developments 
and the performance and operational capabilities 
of foreign materiel, which now or may eventually 
have a practical application for military purposes. 
As with all other intelligence, it is the end product 
resulting from the collection and processing of 
technical information. The scope of technical in-
telligence is broad. It includes all technical aspects 
of foreign equipment, supplies, installations, facil-
ities, communications, and captured or abandoned 
items which have a practical application in fur-
thering military operations. The scope also in-
cludes technical data (i.e., signal parameters/ 
characteristics/frequency operating modes, etc.) 
of foreign communications equipment which are 
derived through communication intelligence 
(COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and 
electronic warfare support measures (ESM), as 
well as captured friendly and allied materiel that 
may have been in the hands of a hostile force. 
Technical intelligence, then, contributes primarily 
to the extension of the combat intelligence effort. 
(See appendix B for categories of technical intel-
ligence.) 
1-5. Scientific and Technieal Intelligence 
a. Scientific and Technical (S&T) Intelligence 
includes that foreign intelligence relating to basic 
and applied research in natural and applied sci-
ences, and in applied engineering techniques. Also 
included are the scientific and technical character-
istics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign 
military systems, weapons, weapons systems, and 
other materiel; production methods employed in 
their manufacture; and related technology per-
taining to materiel operation, and logistic support. 
b. Within the Department of the Army, the As-
sistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ACSI) has 
general staff responsibility for all matters per-
taining to intelligence and counterintelligence 
activities. The organizational element within 
ACSI which exercises general staff supervision 
over S&T intelligence activities of the Army is the 
Scientific and Technical Division, Directorate of 
Foreign Intelligence. This division monitors intel-
ligence produced and the intelligence activities in-
volved in this production to determine that weap-
ons and equipment, scientific, nuclear, chemical, 
missile, space, and electronic requirements levied 
on DA production facilities are fulfilled. This divi-
sion also provides DA representation on scientific 
and technical committees and working groups of 
the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIE). 
Section II. THE STRATEGIC EFFORT 
1-6. Introduction 
a. The objectives of strategic technical intelli-
gence are to-
( 1) Determine capabilities, limitations, and 
vulnerabilities of foreign technology, materiel, fa-
cilities, and installations. 
(2) Exploit foreign technologies for the bene-
fit of US Forces. 
(3) Assist in the development of effective 
countermeasures by providing intelligence to the 
overall military research and development (R&D) 
effort. 
(4) Provide materiel and information upon 
which to base the training of all Armed Forces 
personnel. 
b. The overall military technical intelligence 
program is vital to the US national, scientific, and 
technical intelligence effort. The technical intelli-
gence organization of the Department of Defense 
(DOD) includes elements of the Defense Iritelli-
1-2 
gence Agency (DIA) and the three services or 
military departments: Department of the Army; 
Department of the Navy, and the Department of 
the Air Force. 
1-7. Defense Intelligence Agency 
a. DIA coordinates the intelligence activities of 
the three military departments and satisfies the 
intelligence requirements of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and DOD. In the area of technical intelli-
gence, DIA is responsible for the overall manage-
ment and review of all technical intelligence activ-
ities throughout DOD. 
b. The action element of DIA for its technical 
intelligence responsibility is the Directorate of 
Scientific and Technical Intelligence. Direct com-
munication or coordination is authorized between 
this directorate and the external technical intelli-
gence agencies on nonpolicy matters relating to 
the production of S&T intelligence. The principal 
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producers of technical intelligence within DOD 
are--
( l) Directorate of ·Scientific and .Technical 
Intelligence of DIA. 
(2) Foreign Scienee ~nd Technology Center 
(FSTC) of the US Army Materiel Command 
(USAMC) 
(S) Missile Intelligence Agency (MIA) of the 
Army Missile Command of USAMC. 
(4) Medical Intelligence Office of the Office of 
the Surgeon General of the Army. 
(5) Scientific and Technical Intelligence 
Center (STIC) of the Department of the Navy. 
(6) Foreign Technology Division (FTD) of 
the Department of Air Force. 
1-8. Strategic Role of DA Agencies 
a. ACSI, DA, with. general staff responsibility 
for .all S&T intelligence activities in the Army, 
performs the following functions: 
(1) Formulates policies and procedures 
which insure that S&T intelligence activities of 
the Army are carried out in the most efficient and 
productive manner. 
(2) Supervises the preparation and execution 
of the Army·S&T intelligence program, in coordi-
nation with DIA, and provides for its integration 
into the DOD Consolidated Intelligence Program 
(CIP). 
(3) Coordi'nates requirements for technical 
intelligence originated by the DA staff and major 
subordinate commands to insure that they are ful-
filled. 
b. USAMC is responsible for commanding, OJ>:-
erating, and managing two major CONUS-based 
Army S&T production agencies: FSTC and the 
USAMC Missile Intelligence Agency of·. the Mis-, 
sile Command. USAMC, through .its subordinate 
agencies, is responsible for providing U.S. stra-
tegic planners the military R&D effort and the 
military S&T. effort with timely and appropriate 
technieal intelligence, with the exception of medi-
cal S&T intelligence. 
o. The Surgeon Gener~l of the Army is respon-
sible for commanding, operating, and managing 
the Medical S&T Branch which is part of the 
:Medical Intelligence Office. 
d. The Chief of Engineers has DA staff respon-
sibility to provide program guidance to Army 
component commands on requirements for mili-
tary geographic intelligence, as outlined in FM 
AGO 111U. 
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5-80. Within the Corps of Engineers, the US 
Army Topographic Command (USATOPOCOM) 
is the primary element that deals with national 
level, strategic intelligence. 
e. The US Army Security Agency (USASA) is 
r3sponsible for the exploitation of cryptologic and 
other materiel in support of its 'assigned mission 
areas as outlined in AR 10-122 and FM 32-10. In 
addition, signal intelligence (SIGINT) and ESM 
resources also compile technical data on the char-
acteristics of foreign communications-electronics 
equipment derived from intercept and analysis of 
electromagnetic emissions. 
f. Oversea commands are responsible for col-
lecting and producing , S&T intelligence within 
their capabilities and in accordance with vali-
dated DIA requirements. They are also responsi-
ble for exploiting and evacuating materiel to 
CONUS as appropriate. Reference AR 765-2 and 
AR381-9. 
1-9. Strategic Procedures 
a. A requirement for technical intelligence may 
be originated by any agency or consumer within 
the Army. Frequently, however, a research and 
development (R&D) activity or major CONUS 
command may levj' this requirement upon mili-
tary intelligence resources. 
b. Requirements are prepared using DD Form 
1497 for intelligence production requirements and 
forwarded to DIA for validation and t.asking. The 
DIA tasking procedure recognizes the need for 
direct departmental support. In turn, this support 
will enable the production agencies to provide 
·support to DA and intermediate headquarters for 
quick reaction needs, briefings, and special pur-
pose documents. Direct support tasks in response 
to such requirements may be levied by the ACSI, 
DA, on the FSTC, the Missile Intelligence Agency, 
or the Medical Intelligence Office. The CG, 
USAMC may levy direct support requirements on 
FSTC and the Missile Intelligence Agency. The 
Surgeon General may levy direct support require-
ments on the Medical Intelligence Office. The 
Army organization for strategic technical intelli-
gence is shown in figure 1-1. As requirements are 
satisfied, the information and/or materiel are for-
warded direct, or through major oversea com-
mand channels, to CONUS. Unless specific in-
structions to the contrary are given by a DA 
agency, all items for CONUS exploitation will be 
forwarded to the Commanding General, US Army 
1-3 
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AGO 8118.4. 
Test and Evaluation Command, ATTN: STEAP-
FI, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland 21005, 
in accordance with provisions -0f the theater 
command. After foreign materiel has been re-
ceived at Aberdeen Proving Ground, the decision 
as to the site of actual exploitation of medical 
materiel is determined by the Surgeon General or 
his designated agent. A detailed exploitation plan 
will be furnished ACSI by the agency designated 
to perform the exploitation. 
c. The major DA S&T intelligence production 
effort in CONUS is located at FSTC, Missile In-
telligence Agency, and the Medical Intelligence 
Office. To consolidate the efforts of these organiza-
tions, DIA has established a system which stand-
ardizes S&T intelligence management and produc-
tion procedures for the overall DOD S&T intelli-
AGO 8118A 
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gence production effort. In addition, certain re-
sponsibilities for production of S&T intelligence 
have been assigned within DIA and to the mili-
tary departments. 
d. Final technical intelligence reports are dis-
seminated to various consumers in accordance 
with previously submitted statements of intelli-
gence interest. A continual feedback of informa-
tion from oversea producers to DIA and from 
DIA and CONUS-producing units to the oversea 
major commands is essential to the effectiveness 
of the entire technical intelligence program. The 
distribution of technical information from CON-
US-producing units is made by DIA to the oversea 
command to insure that military intelligence units 
are kept abreast of important foreign technical 
and scientific trends and developments. 
1-5 
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CHAPTER 2 
ARMY TECHNIC:AL INTELLIGENCE 
Section I. 
2-1. Gene,ral 
The United States must strive to maintain a posi-
tion superior to all enemies and potential enemies 
in any given area of technology and be alert to the 
future technological developments of all nations. 
In order to obtain this position the objectives of 
technical intelligence are to: 
a. Determine foreign technical materiel threats 
as they affect strategic and tactical planners and 
commanders. 
b. Determine foreign technological capabilities 
and limitations. 
c. Provide information from which military 
countermeasures are developed. 
d. Provide information which will enable US 
Forces to use foreign materiel and facilities. 
e. Exploit new developments for US military 
needs. 
f. Obtain and exploit items in the DIA Registry, 
Foreign Materiel Requirements Listing. 
g. Provide input on a continuous basis to the 
overall national integrated S&T intelligence pro-
gram in consonance with theater policies. 
h. Provide the technical intelligence aspec~s for 
tactical and strategic studies on characteristics, 
capabilities, and limitations of foreign facilities, 
installations, materiel, and resources. 
2-2. Mission of Tactical Technical 
Intelligence Units 
a. The mission of Army tactical technical intel-
ligence units is to provide assistance to tactical 
commanders through the selective examination, 
evaluation, and classification of technical informa-
tion derived from exploitation of foreign materiel 
and facilities, and provide assistance in establish-
ing security measures to prevent foreign examina-
tion of U.S. equipment and information. 
AGO 3118A 
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b. Tactical technical intelligence units/person-
nel at all levels perform a fourfold mission: 
(1) They advise and assist the commander 
and staff in meeting tactical planning needs in 
technical areas. 
(2) They assist the strategic S&T intelligence 
effort by supporting theater DA and DOD agen-
cies in the overall integrated technical intelligence 
collection and analysis effort. 
(3) They assist with training of units in 
collection procedures. 
(4) They advise units of current technical 
intelligence requirements. 
c. US Army tactical technical intelligence units 
are provided primarily to support the field army 
commander's technical intelligence requirements. 
These military technical intelligence units provide 
on the spot field analysis, detailed analysis, and 
limited operational data from field testing. These 
units are often in a position to make recommenda-
tions for exploitation and/or countermeasures. 
Detailed analysis and evaluation are performed 
by the technical intelligence company of the field 
army and/or higher echelons. Final and detailed 
technical analysis beyond field army and/or thea-
ter resources is performed in the appropriate 
CONUS-producing unit. 
d. Technical intelligence elements at all echelons 
operate as functionally integrated teams to insure 
maximum coordination, collation, and exploitation 
of foreign arms and materiel. 
e. Prompt exploitation at the lower echelons 
provides usable tactical intelligence, assists in the 
production of strategic technical intelligence, fa-
cilitates military training, and assists the overall 
national R&D effort. 
f. In unified or specified commands, the factors 
of distance and processing time from the zone of 
interior may make it desirable for the command-
er's intelligence organizations to perform certain 
2-1 
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functions normally associated with CONUS units .. 
In such cases the unified or specified commander 
advises the higher echelon concerned of the func-
tions being performed. He also insures that his 
action does not interrupt the flow of information 
to the higher echelon. Included among these func-
tions may be : 
(1) Puhlication of technical intelligence bul-
letins. 
(2) Publication of intelligence of a general 
orientation nature. 
(3) Preparation and dissemination of other 
intelligence studies and documents which would 
lose utility if delayed by preparation in the zone 
of interior. 
2-3. Theater Organization for Technical 
lritelligence 
a. The technical intelligence organizational 
concept for theater army is based upon theater 
requirements and the assigned technical intelli-
gence mission. Requirements are generated by the 
technical intelligence :needs of the command and 
its subordinate elements. The technical intelli-
gence mission and guidance for its accomplish-
ment normally will be provided to the theater 
army commander by the theater commander. Spe-
cific tasking as a result of DIA validated produc-
tion requirements will follow this same channel. 
b. The theater army G2 will develop a func-
tional organization for his G2 division which re-
flects the usual theater army mission of coordina-
tion and supervision . of operational, administra-
tive, and territorial responsibilities. Normally, the 
special intelligence branch of the G2 division in-
cludes a S&T section which assists the G2 in ful-
filling his technical intelligence responsibilities. 
Upon receipt of collection directives and other 
technical intelligence requirements, the theater 
army G2 publishes specific directives. which are 
sent through intelligence and ·technical channels to 
collection agencies. 
Section II. FIELD ARMY ORGANIZATION FOR TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
2-4. Field Army Echelon 
a. General. The collection of technical informa-
tion and the production and dissemination of 
technical intelligence in the field army area of 
operations require extensive activity coordination, 
and continuity .of effort. The field army G2 is res-
ponsible for the direction and staff supervision of 
the entire technical intelligence effort within the 
field army. He is assisted by technical intelligence 
staff personnel organic to the field army head-
quarters which is augmented by a technical intel-
ligence coordinator and other technical intelli-
gence personnel from the Army headquarters sup-
port section of the Military Intelligence Battalion, 
Field Army. These personnel normally constitute 
a technical intelligence division or branch within 
the field army G2 section. Staff policy, guidance, 
requirements, and directives pertaining to techni-
cal intelligence collection and production are for-
mulateq by the technical intelligence staff element 
of the field army G2 section and forwarded 
through military intelligence channels for execu-
tion by the technical intelligence company. 
b. Technical Intelligence Company. The techni-
cal intelligence company operates under the direct 
control of the Military Intelligence Battalion, 
Field Army (TOE 30-25). Figure 2-1 shows the 
organization of this military intelligence battal-
ion. The Technical Intelligence Company (TOE 
2-2 
30-34) provides for the functionalized execution 
of the technical intelligence mission, exclusive. of 
collection, within the field army. Figure 2-2 shows 
the organization of the technical intelligence com-
pany. This groupin~ in one company of various 
technical skills provides a capability for a coordi-
nated technical intelligence effort; an interchange 
of skills, knowledge, and experience; and a consol-
idation of specialized technical skills to insure the 
varied functional technical intelligence support 
necessary for the field army. This unit is normally 
located in the vicinity of the headquarters of the 
Field Army Support Command (FASCOM). For 
a detailed discussion of the technical intelligence 
company see FM 30-9. 
2-5. Corps Echelon 
The duties and functions of the corps G2 technical 
intelligence section are similar to those of the 
technical intelligence division or branch of the G2, 
field army (para 2-4a). To augment the organic 
technical intelligence coordinator of the corps G2 
section, a technical intelligence coordinator and 
other technical intelligence personnel are provided 
by the attached military intelligence detachment 
supporting the corps (TOE 30-18). These are 
staff coordinating personnel and normally are not 
employed in as operational role. 
AGO 3118A 
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Ml Bn, 
Field Army 
I I ii 1 I I 
I I Ml Co, I HHC i Ml Co, Ml Co, Ml Co, l lntg I I Ci Coll Tech Intel I 
,,,.._ -___ ..__. __ ----~ ---·-----... _ I I . I 
r------1 ,-----, r-----, 
f Ml Co, I I C I I Ml Det, I 
I Ml o, A d Corp~ or Abn I 1 Div**' I 1 nn Cav Regt I 
I Corps* I 1 I r or Sep Bde*** I L------J ~~----- L _____ _ 
Aulgntd to Ml Bn, Field Army; attached on a quasi-permanent basis to organizations of the Field Anny. 
* Tht number of th11t Companies assigned to the Ml Bn depends upon the number of Corps in a given Field Anny. 
** The number of th11t Companies assigned to the Ml Bn depends upon the number of Divisk»ns in a given Field Anny. 
**• Tht num~tr of thHt Detachments assigned to the Ml Bn dep,nds u~n the number of Annored Cavalry Regiments and 
Saparatt Brlgaclt assigned in a given Field Anny. 
Flgu ... 2-1. TOE 30-25H, mil itory intelli9Mte battalion, field ormy. 
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Flture 2·2· TOE 30-34H, technical intolligenc• company. 
AGO 3ll8A 
2-4 
2-6. Augmentation 
Cellular functional technical intelligence teams 
from TOE 30-600 may provide augmentation to 
the military intelligence organization supporting 
field army, corps, and division as required. These 
AGO 8118A 
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augmentation teams are organized based on seven 
collection areas: quartermaster, signal, chemical, 
transportation, medical, engineer, and ordnance. 
AR 310-10 describes the procedures for obtaining 
authorization for these augmentation teams. 
2-5 
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CHAPTER 3 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONALIZATION 
Section I. 
3-1. Overall Concept 
The five functional areas of technical intelligence 
activities are communications-electronics intelli-
gence, weapons and munitions intelligence, gen-
eral support and equipment intelligence, mobility 
intelligence, and medical intelligence. The proper 
organization and employment of the technical in-
telligence specialists in support of these func-
tional areas is critical to mission accomplishment. 
When employed as functional teams, technical 
analysis and evaluation is accomplished more 
effectively. Personnel must not be given analysis 
tasks which can be more efficiently performed by 
other field army or theater assets. Each function-
ally organized technical intelligence team must be 
tailored to perform the required mission. Teams 
must be flexible in their operations since person-
nel will be required to perform extensive coordi-
GENERAL 
nation and liaison internally for mission success. 
Teams should be "tailored" to perform a specific 
technical intelligence function with consideration 
given to the training and capabilities of the tech-
nical specialists. The functionalized areas of in-
terest of technical specialists will frequently over-
lap. When possible, functional teams should be 
composed of personnel having related .functional 
qualifications. In addition to the capabilities listed 
in the subsequent sections of this chapter, the 
technical intelligence team should be capable of 
coordinating with and conducting periodic brief-
ings to division and higher command headquar-
ters informing them of the equipment being em-
ployed by the foreign units within their area _of 
operations or adjacent areas. The known capabili-
ties and limitations of those aspects of any of the 
five functional areas where new information is 
acquired should be included in these briefings. 
Section II. COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRON.ICS INTELLIGENCE 
3-2. Obiectives 
a. The primary objectives of technical intelli-
gence specialists in the functional area of commu-
nications-electronics intelligence are to: 
(1) Provide communications-electronics 
equipment intelligence concerning the capabilities 
and limitations of foreign communication and 
noncommunication systems, both civilian and mil-
itary. 
(2) Provide data and communications-elec-
tronics /·equipment intelligence If or1 possible :use for 
cover and deception operations on the strategic 
and tactical levels. 
(3) Provide data for possible application in 
developing new US electronic equipment and de-
vices. 
(4) Provide communications-electronics 
equipment intelligence or strategic and tactical 
planning. 
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(5) Assist in providing tactical and strategic 
estimates on enemy communication capabilities to 
include the complete order of battle of ·enemy 
units operating in a specified area of operation. 
b. In meeting the above objectives, there is a 
continuous need to examine, analyze, and test 
communications-electronics equipment and de-
vices; to analyze foreign communications equip-
ment diagrams and schematics; and to analyze 
electromagnetic emissions intercepted from opera-
tional foreign equipments. Recent communication 
trends and developments necessitate that the 
scope of communications-electronics equipment 
intelligence be broadened to include wire, radio, 
teletypewriter, television, satellites, telemetering 
devices, electronic instruments, photography, com-
puters, radar, facsimile, and laser communication 
equipment or devices. 
c. SIGINT and ESM resources are important 
sources of information on the technical parame-
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ters of communications-electronics. equipment. 
This information is derived through the detectiOn, 
intercept, and analysis of electromagnetic emis-
sions. Extensive liaison is, therefore, necessary 
between communications-electronics specialists 
and SIGINT/ESM elements. 
d. In order to properly evaluate and interpret 
information concerning foreign communications-
electronics R&D, and to keep abreast of civilian 
and industrial communications projects, a techni. 
cal library must be established. It should contain 
communications-electronics information concern-
ing details and performance data on a wide vari-
ety of items. 
e. Data in the following areas are of primary 
interest to communications-electronics equipment 
intelligence production : 
( 1) Radio equipment. 
(a) Output power. 
( b) Frequency range. 
( c) Bandwidth. 
(d) Modes of operation. 
( e) Circuitry design. 
(f) Antenna design. 
(g) Antijamrning devices. 
(h) Tube structure. 
( i) Transistors. 
{j) Equipment ruggedness. 
(k) Major modifications. 
( l) Modules. 
( m) Power requirements. 
(n) Size/type (fixed, mobile, or transport.. 
able). 
(2) Telephone equipment. 
(a) Types of operation. 
( b) Power requirements. 
( c) Working limits. 
( d) Type of signal. 
(3) Switchboards. 
(a) Line capacity. 
( b) Protection. 
( c) Power requirements. 
(d) Cord circuits. 
( e) Types of operation. . 
(f) Size/type (fixed, mobile, or transport-
able). 
3-2 
( 4) Teletypewriter equipment. 
(a) Method of transmission and receiving. 
( b) Type of signal. 
(c) Speed. 
(d) Power requirements. 
( e) Line current. 
(f) Signaling code. 
( 5) Facsimile. 
(a) Maximum size of copy. 
( b) Type of recording. 
( c) Drum speed. 
(d) Scanning lines. 
(e) Audio carrier frequency. 
(f) Type modulation. 
(g) Bandwidth. 
(h) Power requirements. 
(6) Carrier equipment. 
(a) Channel capacity. 
( b) Bandwidth. 
(c) Line side operation. 
( d) Loop side operation. 
( e) Transmission media. 
(f) System range. 
(g) Operating levels. 
(h) Signaling frequency. 
(i) Type modulation. 
{j) Power requirements. 
f. Other general areas of interest to communi-
cations-electronics equipment intelligence are-
(1) Sensor devices. 
(2) Missile guidance devices. 
( 3) Power equipment. 
( 4) Meteorological equipment. 
(5) Electronic warfare (EW), electronic 
countermeasures (ECM), ESM, and electronic 
counter-countermeasures· (ECCM) equipment 
and/or devices. 
( 6) Guided missile control systems. 
(7) VT fuze inf.ormation. 
(8) Secure equipment (voice, TTY, an:d 
data). 
(9) Computers and peripheral equipment. 
3-3. Capabilities of Commu11ications-
Electronics Specialists 
a. Communications-electronics specialists . are 
capable of-
(1) Exploiting intelligence from foreign com-
munications materiel. 
(2) Assisting in the exploitation of foreign 
scientific communicati-0ns-electronics information. 
(3) Evaluating enemy communications-elec-
tronics equipment information as received on a 
day-to-day basis. 
(4) Supervising the collection artd evacuation 
of enemy communications-electronics equipment. 
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(5) Coordinating with and providing limited 
assistance, as may be required, to other intelli-
gence activities such as strategic intelligence ele-
ments. 
(6) Maintaining, evaluating, and interpreting 
information concerning military and civilian 
R&D. 
(7) Assisting in the exploitation of foreign 
communications complexes and facilities by US 
Forces. This may require communications-elec-
tronics and EW personnel to accompany combat 
elements whose missions include the capture of 
communications bases or targets for prompt anal-
ysis and exploitation. 
(8) Assisting in the interrogation of all 
enemy captives or returnees who possess informa-
tion concerning enemy or foreign communica-
tions-electronics equipment or the manner in 
which it is deployed. 
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(9) Assisting in the exploitation of all cap-
tured documents dealing with communications-
electronics equipment to obtain immediate combat 
technical intelligence as well as detailed technical 
data. 
(10) Exploiting information derived from in-
tercepted foreign signals to acquire technical data 
on the characteristics of foreign communications-
electronics equipment. 
(11) Exploiting intelligence obtained from 
enemy utilization of sensor devices. 
b. Signal personnel are capable of assisting G2's 
and S2's in performing their technical intelligence 
roles by: 
( 1) Performing limited analysis of enemy 
communications-electronics equipment systems 
and documents. 
(2) Providing photographic support for tech-
nical intelligenc~ activities. 
Section 111. WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS INTELLIGENCE 
3-4. Obiectives 3-5. Capabilities 
The objectives of weapons and munitions intelli-
gence are to provide technical intelligence evalua-
tion and analysis of-' 
a. Free rockets, guided missiles, and associated 
equipment including guidance and launching 
equipment. 
b. Foreign weapons and combat vehicles to in-
clude tanks, towed and self-propelled guns, how-
itzers, and armored personnel carriers. 
c. Nuclear and nonnuclear ammunition, to in-
clude rocket and warhead sections. 
d. Chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons 
and munitions and smoke, incendiary, and flame 
weapons and munitions. 
e. Propellants, explosives, and pyrotechnics, to 
include mines. 
f. Demolition techniques, barriers material, 
minefield layouts. 
g. Specialized munitions and simulators de-
signed for use in cover and deception operations. 
h. Enemy render safe procedures for all US and 
foreign explosive ordnance. 
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Weapons and munitions specialists have the capa-
bilities to: 
a. Provide technical guidance to corps technical 
intelligence collection teams and to evaluate the 
technical information received from them. 
b. Inspect foreign vehicles and weapons to de-
termine modifications and changes. 
c. Identify, examine, and submit reports on tac-
tical capabilities of foreign weapons and muni-
tions. 
d. Assist in the breakdown and assembly of 
equipment and in the testing of vehicles, equip-
ment, and accessories. 
e. Assist analysis of parts, assemblies, engines, 
power trains, and chassis for collation, updating, 
and incorporation of data in technical manuals 
and handbooks. 
f. Assist in the production of technical intelli-
gence from factory markings. 
g. Assist in the identification and evaluation of 
flamethrowers, . smoke generators, riot control 
agent munitions, and chemical and biological 
weapons and munitions. 
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Section IV. GENERAL SUPPORT AND EQUIPMENT INTELLIGENCE 
3-6. General 
The general support and equipment section of the 
evaluation and analysis platoon, technical intelli-
gence company, has two primary areas of inter-
est: logistics intelligence and chemical, biological, 
and radiological technical intelligence. 
3-7. Obiectives of Logistics Intelligence 
a. The primary objectives of logistics intelli-
gence are to-
(1) Provide logistics intelligence on enemy 
supplies and resources. Specific areas of interest 
are subsistence, individual clothing and equip-
ment, decoy items of equipment, general supplies, 
petroleum, maintenance, and equipment for such 
services as graves registration, laundry, and bath. 
(2) Provide the field army with logistics in-
telligence, based on immediate exploitation of ma-
terial and information acquired, as may be signifi-
cant or contributing to the immediate tactical 
mission. 
(3) Provide logistics information and mate-
riel for exploitation at theater or CONUS level. 
b. Technical intelligence analysis of enemy lo-
gistics support must include consideration of 
enemy economic factors ( e g,. food, agriculture, 
and industrial production), the enemy labor force, 
and enemy technological capabilities. In this re-
gard, close coordination between technical intelli-
gence and strategic intelligence elements at field 
army is imperative. 
c. Examination of captured items must be con-
tinuous and must include consideration of the ap-
plied sciences which made development of. the 
item possible. Increase, decrease, or change in a 
nation's equipment and/or supplies gives indica-
tion of a change in that country's logistics support 
capabilities. All analyses must be made with con-
sideration of the social and cultural environment 
of the country concerned. 
3-8. Capabilities of Logistics Specialists 
a. Logistics specialists have the following capa-
bilities: 
(1) Determining the design, performance, 
source, and methods of manufacture and storing. 
(2) Examining logistics organizations, instal-
lations, and storage depots. 
(3) Determining characteristics, limitations, 
vulnerabilities, and military potential of military 
and civilian facilities. 
( 4) Preparing technical intelligence reports 
and studies concerning such items as petroleum, 
food, clothing, equipment, and decoy items of 
equipment. 
( 5) Processing and extracting information 
from foreign commodities and equipmen.t 
acquired in a field army area of responsibility. 
( 6) Assisting in the training of field army 
personnel in foreign equipment and logistics intel-
ligence. · 
(7) Producing and maintaining information 
and intelligence concerning foreign materiel and 
commodities. 
( 8) Assisting in the analysis o:f foreign stor-
age, packing, and preparation of food and equip-
ment. · 
b. In conjunction with other technical intelli-
gence specialists, logistics specialists provide a 
capability to the field army for supervising battle-
field collection of a wide variety of items. For 
example, through the use of mobile laboratories 
available at, theater level, the analysis, evaluation, 
and identification of captured foreign petroleum 
products and facilities for US tactical uses are 
expedited. 
e. Other areas of technical intelligence to which 
logistics specialists can contribute are analysis of : 
(1) Troop subsistence. 
(2) Logistics support equipment and supplies 
in all commodity groups as listed in SB 708-21. 
(3) Food spoilage and contamination. 
(4) Packaging and marking. 
(5) Data concerning draft animals. 
(6) Individual and collective protection 
equipment, protective clothing, and decontamina-
tion supplies. 
d. Logistics technical intelligence may assist 
order of battle sections by identification of enemy 
uniforms, insignia and decorations, and by main-
taining logistics files. 
3-9. Obiectives of CBR and Nuclear 
Technical Intelligence 
The objectives of CBR and nuclear technical intel-
ligence are-
a. The collection, examination, evaluation, iden-
tification, and dissemination of information on 
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materiel ·and documents pertaining t-0 enemy 
chemical, biological, and nuclear operations. 
b. The collection of samples of chemical and 
biological agents and radiological materiel em-
ployed against friendly forces; the identification 
of chemical agents and/or transmittal of samples 
to a supporting general chemical laboratory for 
chemical and toxicological analysis; the transmit-
tal of biological samples to a supporting medical 
laboratory for microbiological analysis; and the 
collection and forwarding of radiological samples 
to a supporting general chemical laboratory for 
determination of radioisotopic composition. 
c. The collection, evaluation, and dissemination 
of information pertaining to the enemy's capabil-
ity of and :techniques and procedures for; decon-
tamination; individual and collective protection; 
CBR detection and identification systems; warn-
ing of chemical, biological and nuclear attacks: 
impregnation and reimpregnation of clothing; 
cover and deception measures; field laboratory 
services; fallout predictions; and radiological 
monitoring and survey operations. 
d. The collection and dissemination of informa-
tion on the enemy's capability for chemical and 
biological agent production, to include their stor-
age, insta11ations, and stockpiles of chemical and 
biological agents/munitions, and for chemical and 
biological operations in support of tactical opera-
tions. 
e. Assistance, within the technical intelligence 
company capabilities, in developing field counter-
measures against enemy chemical, biological, and 
nuclear operations. 
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3-10. Capabilities of CBR and Nuclear 
Technical Intelligence 
Chemical personnel in technical intelligence units 
are capable of providing the following assistance: 
a. Examining, evaluating, and identifying cap-
tured enemy chemical and biological agents and 
radiological materiel. 
b •. Examining, evaluating, and identifying, 
when possible, enemy materiel related to chemi-
cal, biological, or nuclear operations. 
c. Preparing and forwarding samples of biologi-
cal agents to medical laboratory facilities for 
identification. 
d. Preparing and forwarding samples of chemi-
cal and radiological materials to the general chem-
ical laboratory. 
e. Providing technical assistance to staffs at 
Army and corps levels on chemical, biological, and 
nuclear matters. 
f. Maintaining liaison with the theater general 
chemical laboratory. 
g. Preparing intelligence reports on chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear matters, -and 
estimates of enemy capabilities and intentions for 
employing chemical, biological, and nuclear opera-
tions. 
h. Analyzing and identifying enemy-delivered 
chemical agents within the limitations of the CBR 
agent sampling kit and the CBR agent analyzing 
kit. 
Section V. MOBILITY INTELLIGENCE 
3-11. Obiectives 
The objectives of mobility technical intelligence 
cover most aspects of engineer and transportation 
activity at all echelons of the foreign military or-
ganizations. Engineer and transportation support 
have become increasingly important in all types of 
military operations. Mobility technical intelli-
gence specialists will usually be involved in both 
strategic and tactical technical intelligence. (See 
FM 30-5 for the interrelationship of combat and 
strategic intelligence.) The field army technical 
intelligence company will have to meet the needs 
of the theater and lower echelons. Frequently, the 
same items of mobility intelligence may be needed 
by various levels within the field army and the 
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theater. Mobility technical intelligence will play 
an important part in the overall strategic and tac-
tical planning :for field army and theater forces. 
3-12. Capabilities 
a. Transportation mobility specialists contrib-
ute to the production of technical intelligence con-
cerning foreign air, land, and water transporta-
tion equipment of immediate or potential military 
importance. This intelligence concerns character-
istics, conditions, development, organization, ma-
. teriel, operation, maintenance, construction, per-
formance, eapabilities, and limiting factors of for-
eign transportation equipment and supplies. Mo-
bility technical intelligence is necessary for con-
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tingency planning and emergency operations. 
Transportation specialists will need tO produce in-
telligence on adjacent friendly countries for use 
by technical and strategic planners and combat 
service support elements since US Forces may 
often use another nation's transportation system. 
b. Mobility specialists can contribute to the fol-
lowing: 
(1) Integration and coordination of the 
transportation collection effort, to include esti-
mates of capabilities of transportation facilities 
and systems. 
(2) Evaluation, interpretation, processing, 
and dissemination of transportation information 
and data to include estimates of capabilities of 
transportation facilities and systems. 
(3) Assistance in the preparation of trans-
portation estimates. 
( 4) Assistance in the interrogation of civil-
ian and military personnel having transportation 
intelligence information. 
(5) Assistance in strategic transportation 
planning. 
(6) Evaluation of new transportation modes, 
systems, and related equipment. 
(7) Assistance in determining an estimate of 
foreign capabilities to transport missiles and nu-
clear weapons. 
(8) Evaluation of economic and technical as-
pects of foreign transportation systems. 
(9) Compilation of data on foreign transpor-
tation modes, systems, facilities, and equipment. 
c. Engineer mobility specialists contribute to 
limited analyses and evaluation of technical intel-
ligence concerning the following: 
(1) Foreign vehicles, except combat vehicles. 
(2) Foreign engineer equipment to include its 
capabilities. 
(3) Foreign construction operations, tech-
niques, and resources. 
(4) Materiel quality and shortages. 
(5) Foreign depots, dumps, and supply 
points. 
(6) Water-crossing equipment and tech. 
niques. 
(7) Demolition techniques, barrier materials, 
and minefield layouts. 
(8) A bibliography of foreign military and 
civilian engineer specialists and engineer order of 
battle. 
(9) Studies to evaluate the destructive capa-
bility of nuclear weapons. 
Section VI. ME,DICAL INTELLIGENCE 
3-13. Definitions 
a. Medical intelligence is intelligence resulting 
from collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpre-
tation of foreign medical, bio-scientific and envi-
ronmental information. This intelligence is of in-
terest to strategic and military medical planning 
and operations for the conservation of the fighting 
strength of friendly forces. It will also aid in for-
mulating assessments of foreign capabilities in 
both military and civilian sectors. Medical intelli-
gence must retain integrity so that the end prod-
uct will include all available information, immedi-
ately or potentially significant. This includes in-
formation which affects the health and welfare of 
men and animals in actual or potential areas of 
military operations. Such information is vital in 
both strategic and tactical planning and will in-
fluence military operations. 
b. Medical technical intelligence is not primar-
ily materiel oriented. Examination, evaluation, 
and classification of medical materiel are only seg-
ments of the total medical technical intelligence 
effort. Medical intelligence is a functional entity 
and should not be fragmented. Strategic require-
ments indicate the need for intelligence concern-
ing the relatively broad areas of foreign medical 
technical developments, performance, and opera-
tional capabilities. 
3-14. Obiectives · 
The objectives of medical intelligence are to pro-
vide the commander, his medical staff, and his 
operational planners with intelligence that will 
provide a precise estimate of the environmental 
factors confronting a force in a given geographi-
cal area. This includes epidemiological inf orma-
tion, flora, fauna, and sanitary conditions as well 
as the potential enemies' field medical delivery 
system. This fotelligence is designed to insure con-
servation of friendly forces fighting strength. At 
the strategic level, medical intelligence objectives 
are the provisions of intelligence that contribute 
significantly to the formulating of rrational and 
international policy predicated on foreign capabil-
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ities in both military and civilian sectors of the 
bio-scientific community. 
3-15. Capabilities, 
a. Medical intelligence resources for exploita-
tion· purposes in a theater will be few. A 12-man 
medical intelligence section is assigned to the Mil-
itary Intelligence Group and the Military Intelli-
gence Battalion supporting the theater army and 
field army respectively. A smaller 4-man team 
may be assigned in support of separate corps and 
cellular 3-man units are attached where support is 
required. HQ Company, Medical Command, as 
well as HQ Detachment, Medical Group and HQ 
Detachment, Medical Brigade, as presently consti-
tuted, have a token medical intelligence comple-
ment in the Plans, Intelligence, and Operations 
Section/Division. 
b. The theater surgeon can coordinate the em-
ployment of medical units in support of medical 
intelligence activities. He may also arrange for 
support of field army medical intelligence activi-
ties by theater level units as appropriate. In addi-
tion, the theater surgeon and his staff can assist 
the field evaluated medical intelligence produced 
by :field army technical intelligence elements. The 
:field army surgeon can assist in providing re-
quirements for medical information/intelligence 
to the Command G2. The intelligence produced 
may be coordinated and evaluated by the field 
army surgeon and staff as necessary. 
e. The Medical Intelligence Office, Office of the 
Surgeon General, at CONUS level can provide in-
formation, debriefing specialists, and in-depth ma-
teriel .exploitation as designated in AR 381-9, 
Army Scientific and Technical Intelligence. Trans-
mission of this type intelligence may be accom-
plished direct through medical technical channels. 
d. Medical intelligence specialists are capable of 
performing the following functions: 
(1) Collect, examine, classify, and evaluate 
raw information concerning non-US health prob-
lems, training, and materiel used by foreign medi-
cal services. 
(2) Provide medical intelligence information 
to the field army surgeon through G2 for profes-
sional evaluation prior to dissemination. 
(3) Assist in the interrogation of selected 
prisoners of war, refugees, defectors, and escapees 
to obtain medical information. 
(4) Assist in the investigation of medical as-
pects of incidents involving diseases resulting 
from enemy biological agent employment and cas-
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ualties resulting from enemy chemical and nu-
clear operations. 
( 5) Accomplish initial examination and evac-
uation of captured foreign medical materiel to in-
clude escort of live cultures to CONUS. 
(6) Assist in the compilation of environmen-
tal data pertinent to health aspects of military 
operations. 
(7) Provide technical staff advice on medical 
intelligence to include the scope of medical sub-
j ects to be incorporated into medical unit training 
programs. 
(8) Provide limited analysis of drugs, ser-
ums, and antibiotics. 
(9) Provide intelligence information on the 
movement, quantities, 80urces, potency, and types 
of illicit drugs that may be encountered by 
friendly forces. 
(10) Assist in the identification of enemy 
chemical and biological agents and radiological 
materiel. 
(11) Assist in the evaluation of fillings of 
enemy chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. 
(12) Provide information and data on medi-
cal aspects of enemy combat operations. 
(13) Assist, as required, in the preparation 
of medical studies and reports of tactical signifi-
cance. 
(14) Collect and examine status, capabilities, 
and limitations of foreign military and civilian 
medical installations and facilities. 
(15) Provide advice on communicable di-
seases. 
e. Medical information of potential intelligence 
value is primarily obtained by-:-
(1) Direct observation of patients and medi-
cal support operations, both military and civilian. 
(2) Discussions with personnel involved di-
rectly or indirectly with medical support opera-
tions (enemy, allied, or civilian). 
(3) Study of military and civilian reports 
and publications of medical or technical nature. 
(4) Interrogation or interview of prisoners 
of war, refugees, evacuees, displaced persons, and 
friendly escapees. 
(5) Examination, exploitation, and disposi-
tion of foreign medical scientific and technical 
materiel for intelligence as well as R&D purposes. 
(6) Coordination with Civil Affairs public 
health teams who obtain information on the 
public health service and facilities in an area of 
operation. 
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(7) Review of foreign individual medical rec-
ords, statistics, and health reports to assist in fur-
ther evaluation of the efficiency of friendly mate-
riel used. 
(8) Evaluating foreign capabilities through 
reviewing and interpreting individual immuniza-
tion records and contemplated or existing preven-
tive medicine programs. (Prophylactic immuniza-
tions, drugs, protective drugs, clothing, and insect 
repellents.) 
f. Special Warfare Capabilities 
(1) Medical intelligence contributes signifi-
cantly to the planning, preparation, and execution 
of activities related to unconventional warfare, 
stability operations, and psychological operations 
by-
( a) Providing information on the best ap-
proach to foreign and primitive cultures. 
(b) Recommending the adoption of tech-
niques to reduce interpersonal stress developing 
in small isolated detachments working in a for-
eign culture. 
( c) Advising the planning staff on the 
medical evaluation of ethnic groups in operational 
areas or potential areas of commitment. Of 
concern will be those factors which affect their 
efficiency, capability, and well-being. 
(2) The medical intelligence officer in sup-
port of guerrilla forces will work closely with the 
Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force 
(JUWTF). He will assist the J2 in determining 
medical intelligence requirements, establishing 
EEI and ascertaining which agencies can fulfill 
the special medical intelligence requirements for 
the support of the guerrilla forces. The medical 
intelligence officer will provide information con-
cerning the level of medical training suitable to 
the guerrilla forces as well as physical and. other 
medical limitations affecting their performance. 
(3) The nature of the enemy and the pres-
ence of both friendly and hostile civilians in sta-
bility operations, place additional requirements 
upon the command for medical intelligence. In ad-
dition to determining the receptivity of the local 
people to western medical practices, medical intel-
ligence can assist in intelligence activities involv-
ing close coordination with and participation in 
civil police type operations such as; 
(a) Documentation of civilians (and regis-
tration). 
(b) Informal interrogations. 
(c) Maintenance of extensive dossiers. 
( d) Medical civic actions. 
(4) The detailed intelligence required for 
psychological operations often is complementary 
to the accomplishment of the medical mission. 
Medical personnel are concerned with the atti-
tudes of friendly forces, the enemy, and the civil-
ian populace as they affect the health, medical 
practices, morale, and the individual's well-being. 
This large area of mutual interest indicates the 
need for close coordination and liaison between 
the psychological operations personnel and medi-
cal intelligence personnel. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLANNING 
4-1. General 
Planning of the collection effort involves basically 
the same procedures and considerations regard-
less of the type of information desired. The collec-
tion of technical information is but one facet of 
the overall collection effort· of a command. See 
appendix B for the major categories of technical 
intelligence used for planning purposes. Planning, 
a continuing process, involves initially the estab-
lishment of general policies and procedures for 
the collection and production effort (FM 30-5). 
Subsequently, it involves modification and expan-
sion of the plan to support specific combat mis-
sions and operations of the command. The key to 
effective collection of technical information is the 
tactical commander and his unit. Consequently, 
incorporation of technical intelligence planning 
into the planning for specific missions or opera-
tions of tactical units is essential to the produc-
tion of effective technical intelligence. Prepara-
tion of technica1 intelligence plans is performed 
by the intelligence officer or staff at each echelon 
of command. The technical intelligence unit com-
mander is responsible for internal planning of his 
unit's operations. 
4-2. Initial Planning 
Initial planning will be directed more to the estab-
lishment of policies and procedures for the collec-
tion and production effort than to the specific in-
telligence requirements of the command. Initial 
planning must include provisions for-
a. Proper training of members of the command 
in recognition, handling, and reporting of foreign 
materiel and documents. 
b. Insuring retention in place, if practicable, of 
new or unusual items of captured enemy materiel 
for initial analysis and exploitation by appropri-
ate technical intelligence personnel. 
c. Safeguarding captured materiel against loot-
ing, unauthorized destruction, or retention as sou-
venirs. 
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d. Standardized reporting of captured enemy 
materiel and dissemination of reports to higher 
and other appropriate headquarters. 
e. Insuring availability of technical intelligence 
personnel, as required, in conjunction with spe-
cific missions or combat operations. 
f. Supervision and direction of the evacuation 
of captured or abandoned enemy materiel from 
collecting points. through or to the field army area. 
4-3. Planning Procedures 
a. It is imperative that technical inteUigence 
management, planning, collection, and production 
procedures be standardized to minimize duplica-
tion of effort and dissipation of resources. Stand-
ardization of planning and reporting procedures 
facilitates production, selection of resources for 
collection, programing, meeting time schedules, 
and dissemination of technical intelligence. 
b. Development of the technical intelligence 
plan involves the following steps: 
(1) Determination of the technical intelli-
gence requirements based on the mission of the 
command and the requirements of higher head-
quarters. 
(2) Determination of priorities to insure ef-
ficient utilization of collection resources. 
(3) Balancing of requirements with collec-
tion and production capabilities. 
( 4) Selection of appropriate collection agen-
cies and issuance of orders and requests for spe-
cific information. 
(5) Formation of appropriate functional 
teams to insure maximum materiel exploitation. 
(6) Review of vital technical intelligence sup-
port areas to determine adequacy of equipment 
tags, evacuation procedures, provisions for estab-
lishment of specific collecting points, and other 
administrative and logistical items and proce-
dures. 
c. The planning effort is continued by the super-
vision of the intelligence officer or member of his 
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staff over the collection effort to insl,1.re compli-
ance with orders, monitor incoming information, 
and insure that the overall technical intelligence 
plan is working effectively. 
d. Technical intelligence planning must include 
consideration of technical intelligence production, 
its responsiveness to needs, and the cost of the 
overall production effort. 
4-4. Technical Intelligence Plan 
a. The detailed preparation of the formal tech-
nical intelligence plan is accomplished by the tech-
nical intelligence coordinator who is attached to 
the intelligence staff at corps and higher levels. 
He coordinates the plan with technical intelli-
gence units and with other general and special 
staff elements. The purpose of the plan is to estab-
lish procedures for the following: 
(1) Collection and processing of technical in-
formation. 
(2) Handling of foreign materiel. 
(3) Dissemination of technical intelligence. 
(4) Organization for intelligence task force 
operations. 
( 5) Employment of the functional technical 
intelligence teams. 
(6) Determining additional information or 
equipment needs concerni:rw enemy materiel. 
b. A recommended format for the technical in-
telligence plan is contained in appendix C. The 
plan, when issued, is an appendix to the intelli-
gence annex of the operations order. 
c. Supporting technical intelligence plans will 
be prepared at subordinate echelons by the appro-
priate intelligence officers. 
4-5. Technical Intelligence Requirements 
and Priorities 
a. Technical Intelligence Requirements. 
(1) General. The command intelligence 
officer, in coordination with the technical intelli-
gence unit commander, will determine the techni-
cal intelligence requirements of the command and 
the order of priority. Technical intelligence re-
quirements serve to focus the attention of intelli-
gence agencies of the command on the current 
specific technical information needs; they also 
serve as the basis for orders and requests issued 
to implement the collection effort. 
(2) Formulation of requirements. Formula-
tion of technical intelligence requirements is 
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accomplished in a manner parallel to that of the 
formulation of combat intelligence requirements. 
The following considerations, with occasional 
modifications, will serve as guides in formulation 
of technical intelligence requirements: 
(a) Enemy technical capabilities. 
( b) Enemy technical vulnerabilities. 
( c) Weather and terrain information. 
(d) Technical order of battle information. 
( e) The next or forthcoming mission or 
operation of the command. 
(f) Prevention of technical surpirse to the 
command. 
(g) Technical information needs of higher 
and adjacent headquarters. 
(3) Coordination of technical intelligence 
needs. Each echelon of command receives the 
technical information requirements of higher, 
lower, and adjacent headquarters; integrates 
them with those of the command ; incorporates 
them into collection directives and requests; and 
disseminates these orders and requests to appro-
priate collection sources and agencies. Close coor-
dination must be effected between headquarters to 
assist planning and collection. Many requirements 
originate at DA or DOD level and are forwarded 
in the form of collection directives or specific in-
telligence collection requirements. Conversely the 
requirements of a lower echelon may be satisfied 
quicker and more satisfactorily at a higher eche-
lon or by an adjacent unit. 
b. Priorities. Priorities are utilized to direct the 
collection resources of a command toward definite 
objectives in priority of their needs. Require-
ments from higher headquarters will include spe.. 
cific priorities. Priorities of the local command 
will ·be governed by command SOP whjch will 
guide the intelligence officer in assigning priorities 
to the technical intelligence requirements. Recur-
ring technical requirements should be programed 
in advance and priorities changed in accordance 
with the critical dates involved (e.g., to meet re-
curring deadlines for annual studies in specific 
technical areas). 
/f/ 
c. Requests for technical intelligence. Requests 
originating within the field army will be for-
warded to the appropriate command through in-
telligence channels. Such requests must be as spe.. 
cific as possible. If they are based on previous 
technical and/or combat intelligence reports, such 
reports must be fully identified. Over-statement of 
requirements must be avoided. Requests for tech-
AGO 811SA 
·~ nical intelligence will follow theater policies. As a 
minimum, they should include the following: 
(1) Requesting organization. 
(2) Specific requirement. 
(;3) Scope of ·requirement. 
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(4) Reason for requirement. 
( 5) Pertinent data of assistance to technical 
intelligence personnel. 
( 6) Date desired. 
(7) References (if applicable). 
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CHAPTER 5 
COLLE.CTION AND COLLECTION AGENCIES 
Section I. 
5-l. General 
a. Technical intelligence collection teams are de-
pendent almost entirely on other units (particu-
larly tactical units) for the acquisition of foreign 
materiel and documents. For this reason frequent 
liaison and coordination with all types of units 
are essential to stress the importance of technical 
intelligence requirements, particularly those with 
high priority. Close coordination with intelligence 
personnel operating at lower echelons is particu-
larly important since their operations throughout 
any area enable them to acquire significant techni~ 
cal intelligence information and materiel. M-0st 
items of technical intelligence interest will be 
acquired initially by tactical units in the course of 
combat operations. Tactical or other units may 
also acquire items by discovery in an overrun 
area, seizure (in raids), or requisitioning, pur~ 
chase, or confiscation (e.g., as by civil affairs 
units). 
b. The intelligence officer or staff, in developing 
the technical intelligence plan, will select those 
collection agencies which can best fulfill the needs 
of technical intelligence. The technical intelligence 
company should make frequent recommendations 
to the command intelligence officer or staff for 
inclusion in the technical intelligence plan of the 
company's specific equipment and materiel needs 
as well as requirements for essential technical 
documents, manuals, and photographs. When only 
component elements of a piece of equipment are 
required, identification must be sufficiently precise 
to preclude the unnecessary collection of the com-
plete item. Collection agencies must be made 
aware of the potential value of new or unusual 
items of opportunity, i.e., an item not included in 
requirements or wanted lists. 
c. Many priority technical intelligence collection 
requirements generated by programs at national 
and DOD levels will be distributed to collection 
agencies in the form of the Registry, Foreign Ma-
A.GO SUSA. 
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teriel Requirements Listing. Such equipment, 
when obtained, must be evacuated immediately 
(chap 6). Technical intelligence collection person-
nel at corps must maintain familiarity with this 
list, and tactical units and other collectors must 
receive instructions on the action to be taken 
should such listed items be acquired. 
5-2. Coordination 
a. Frequent coordination between technical in-
telligence elements and all types of units within 
the field army is essential and will facilitate and 
supplement the technical information collection 
effort. Necessity for coordination with tactical 
units has been mentioned. Invaluable assistance 
may be obtained by technical intelligence person-
nel through coordination and Hai.son with such 
diverse units as air defense, signal, intelligence, 
Army aviation, and general and special staff ele-
ments, The advantages of coordination with units 
of the field army support command and its subor-
dinate facilities should not be overlooked. 
b. Accomplishment of the following coordina-
tion objectives will contribute immeasurably to the 
technical intelligence collection effort: 
(1) Prompt securing and reporting of foreign 
materiel by capturing units. 
(2) Location and identification of foreign 
items and technical information obtained by 
means other than capture. 
(3) Acquisition of baekground and collateral 
information pertaining to foreign materiel. 
(4) Maintenance of current knowledge (by 
technical intelligence personnel) on technical 
trends and developments. 
(5) Determination of the potential for col-
lecting new or any previously unacquired items of 
foreign materiel. 
( 6) Orientation of combat, combat support, 
and combat service support units and personnel 
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on their technical intelligence roles, and determi-
nation of their requirements for technical intelli-
gence. 
(7) Comparison and exchange of informa-
tion, as authorized, with allied collection and tech-
nical intelligence agencies, as well as with those of 
other US services and agencies. 
( 8) Coordinating and exchanging informa-
tion as authorized with SIGINT/ESM collection 
units. 
Section H. COLLECTION AGENCIES 
5-3. Introduction 
A collection agency for technical intelligence is a 
person, unit, organization, or instrumentality 
which may collect or acquire foreign materiel or 
data. Acquisition may be through routine collec-
tion by troops, research, observation, analysis and 
evaluation, or interrogation. Technical intelli-
gence collection agencies include: 
a .. Combat troop units (including Special Forces 
operational detachments). 
b. Military intelligence units (e.g., interroga-
tion, counter-intelligence, imagery interpretation, 
and special collection elements). 
c. Corps technical intelligence teams. 
d. Psychological operations units. 
e. Strategic intelligence elements. 
f. Airborne infantry ranger company units. 
g. Civil affairs units. 
h. Engineer topographic and terrain units. 
i. USASA and EW units. 
j. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units. 
k. Military police units. 
l. CBR reconnaissance teams. 
m. Combat service support units. 
5-4. Combat Troops 
Units in contact are usually the first to encounter 
new or modified foreign materiel, often with re-
lated operating instructions or other accompany-
ing technical documents. The intelligence officer at 
each level must insure that captured equipment or 
documents are recovered for technical intelligence 
exploitation. Vital technical intelligence materiel, 
particularly new discoveries, should not be de-
stroyed prior to technical intelligence exploita-
tion, circumstances permitting. Enemy materiel, 
documents, and logistical complexes must be 
promptly safeguarded and reported through intel-
ligence channels so that the maximum technical 
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data. may be obtained. This is of special impor-
tance in the case of documents relating to enemy 
communications-electronics systems, e.g., code 
books, call signs, frequency tables, communica-
tions-electronics operation instructions (CEO!), 
communications-electronics standing instructions 
(CESI), cryptographic data and items, and en-
crypted items. Items, control knobs, and switches 
of communications equipment should not be 
moved until they have been photographed or their 
positions recorded. The foregoing considerations 
must be included in all operational plans and in 
briefings at each level of command. They should 
also be emphasized in unit training programs. 
5-5. Military Intelligence Units 
The activities and operations of military intelli-
gence units within the field army result in access 
to, or acquisition of, numerous technical docu-
ments, data and items of information on foreign 
materiel. Military intelligence personnel have fre-
quent contact with military and civilian personnel 
who are excellent sources of technical informa-
tion. The functions of interrogation, counterintel-
ligence and special collection elements result in 
the acquisition of information of great signifi-
cance to technical intelligence. These elements are 
responsive to specific requests for technical infor-
mation. Imagery interpretation elements are par-
ticularly helpful in establishing collection poten-
tial and confirming certain aspects of technical 
intelligence. 
5-6. Corps Technical Intelligence Collection 
Teams 
Technical intelligence collection teams are trained 
in the collection of, and search for, items of tech-
nical intelligence interest and related data and in-
formation. Targets of their collection and search 
activities include foreign materiel, facilities. 
methods, techniques, and technical activities. 
Collection teams are available from the field 
army, Technical Intelligence Company, TOE 30 to 
34, and/or the cellular teams available from thea-
ter army, TOE 30-600. 
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5-7. Psychological Operations (PSYOP} 
Units 
Personnel of PSYOP units in support of theater, 
field army, corps, and division may lend assist-
ance in special skills ,technical knowledge. and use 
of such equipment as radios, televisions, loud-
speakers, and printing equipment. The peculiarity 
of PSYOP indicates that specific requirements 
which such units may fulfill are best met by direct 
coordination of technical intelligence personnel 
with PSYOP units. 
5-8. Strategic Intelligence Elements 
The strategic intelligence elements at theater and 
field army, in their .research and study effort, de-
velop information which is of value to the overall 
technical intelligence effort. Such elements will be 
responsive to }?road technical intelligence require-
ments, mainly those involving higher echelons of 
enemy forces. 
5-9. Airborne Infantry Ranger Company 
Unit$ 
The extended depths into enemy areas at which 
long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP) oper-
ate provide an opportunity for them to obtain in-
formation on new or previously unacquired mate-
riel, locations, estimates of weapons .ranges, and 
other technical data. 
5-10. Civil Affairs Units 
a. The civil affairs organization consists of 
staffs, units. and functional teams. Civil affairs 
units provide command support or area support to 
tactical or administrative units and are. assigned 
to support civil affairs operations at specific eche-
lons of command or level of government. The size 
and capabilities of civil affairs units and cellular 
functional teams may vary; however, the person-
nel assigned to them are trained specialists who 
are technically qualified to provide assistance in 
various specialized functional areas which are 
considered to be in the normal range of technical 
intelligence units. These areas include-
(1) Food and agriculture. 
(2) Public communications. 
(3) Public health. 
(4) Public transportation. 
(5) Civilian supply. 
( 6) Public works and utilities. 
(7) Commerce and industry. 
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b. Among potential sources for civil affairs 
units are: 
(1) Civilian technicians among refugees, eva-
cuees, and displaced persons. 
(2) Military personnel with technical back-
grounds. 
( 3) Civilian technicians and scientists asso-
ciated with foreign governments or forces. 
(4) Governmental technical documents, spe-
cialized libraries, and archives. 
(5) Industrial and scientific records. 
(6) Technical blueprints, plans, manuals, or 
other information containing technical intelli-
gence in the mobility, communications-electronics, 
weapons and munitions, chemical, biological, nu-
clear /radiological, and medical fields. 
c. Direct assistance to technical intelligence 
units may be provided by civil affairs units in the 
procurement of technical materiel, identification 
of foreign technical personnel, and recruitment or 
hiring of civilian technicians, scientists, profes-
sional people, and skilled craftsmen and laborers. 
Civil affairs personnel may procure-
(1) Civilian equipment. 
(2) Medical instruments, drugs, and other 
medical supplies. 
(3) Civilian motor vehicles, construction 
equipment and materials. 
( 4) Fuels, lubricants, greases. and propel-
lants 
5-11. Engineer Topographic and Terrain 
Units 
Engineer topographic and terrain units are desig-
nated the· responsibility for the collection, evalua-
tion, and dissemination of topographic informa-
tion and terrain intelligence. They normally func-
tion at theater, field army, and corps levels, with 
the division engineer having the responsibility at 
division level. Their special skilis and technical 
knowledge in the field of topography and terrain· 
intelligence relate closely to many categories ·Of 
technical intelligence and may be of assistance in 
collection planning as well as in the analysis and 
exploitation of foreign materiel and technical doc-
uments. 
5-12. USASA and Electronic Warfare Units 
Technical intelligence units must coordinate all 
efforts in the field of communications-electronics 
intelligence with the appropriate USA$A and EW 
units. USASA is tasked with the timely exploita-
tion of all known or suspected sources possessing 
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possible target exploitation (TAREX) or other 
technical data. TAREX is a SIGINT activity deal-
ing with the collection of foreign cryptologic docu-
ments and information. Other technical data in-
cludes foreign communications-electronics equip-
ment characteristics and operating modes derived 
from COMINT, ELINT, and ESM activities, as 
outlined in FM 32-10, FM 32-20, and AR 10-122. 
TARBX personnel are thoroughly conversant 
with USASA technical operations requirements 
and can brief and lend assistance to technical in-
telligit::nce personnel in determining proper dispo-
sition of materiel of interest to USASA. 
5-13. Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units 
a. General. Technical intelligence personnel 
should be familiar with EOD activities and re-
spons:ibilities (AR 75-15, AR 75-14) in view of 
the importance of foreign explosive ordnance to 
technical intelligence. The danger of fires, explo-
sions, burns, and accidental functioning of explo-
sive ordnance dictates the need for EOD person-
nel. The possibility that abandoned items may be 
boobytrapped requires that such items be dis-
armed or evacuated. FM 9-6 discusses the recov-
ery and evacuation of ammunition; FM 9-47 con-
tains information on special ammunition. FM 
9-14 and FM 9-15 discuss EOD operations and 
responsibilities in support of technical intelli-
gence. 
b. Foreign Ammunition. Foreign ammunition is 
of great value to the intelligence effort. Samples 
of ammunition are of major value to the R&D 
efforts of the Army, and may also have immediate 
tactical significance. Particularly, new or modified 
items of foreign ammunition are of great signifi-
cance. Information on foreign ammunition is in-
valuable to order of battle intelligence; evaluation 
of probable enemy courses of action, capabilities, 
and vulnerabilities ; and development of counter-
measures. Strategic value may derive from mark-
ings, materials used, or the mere fact of existence 
of a certain item. Of tactical concern is the knowl-
edge of employment. effectiveness, and possible 
countermeasures. Ammunition, duds, components, 
and fragments may reveal the type and caliber of 
enemy supporting weapons. Recovered sabotage 
or boobytrap devices may provide valuable indica-
tions of probable enemy courses of action. Manu-
facturing methods and details of design are valua-
ble to R&D agencies of the Army. Information of 
the following items is of value: 
(1) New items of enemy explosive ordnance 
with complete technical data on construction, 
markings, and functioning. 
(2) Design or changes in design of known 
explosive ordnance. 
(3) Changes in manufacturing techniques. 
( 4) Quality and type of material and explo-
sive content. 
(5) Packing, storage, and maintenance tech-
niques. 
(6) Place and date of manufacture. 
(7) All documents relating to the foregoing, 
including sources or potential sources of inf orma-
tion. 
(8) All specialized explosive ordnance de-
signed to.simulate small arms, crew-served weap.. 
ons, and artillery fire for cover and deception. 
· c. EOD Operations. Close coordination is essen-
tial since technical intelligence personnel must 
rely on EOD personnel for disposal and evacua-
tion of explosive ordnance, and conversely. EOD 
units are obligated to notify technical intelligence 
personnel of the types and locations of new items 
of foreign materiel and munitions. Recovery and 
evacuation of explosive ordnance and related 
items are discussed in chapter 6. 
d. Reports. All information collected by EOD 
personnel on first-seen foreign explosive ordnance 
must be reported immediately through EOD con-
trol centers to EOD staff officers. At staff level 
such reports will be placed in intelligence chan-
nels for distribution to all interested levels of 
command. Additional information concerning 
technical intelligence reports is found in para-
graphs 7-10 through 7-13 and appendix D. 
(1) Preliminary Technical Report (PRETE-
CllREP). This report is prepared by EOD per-
sonnel upon recognition of an item of expl_osive 
ordnance as an item of technical intelligence 
value. It is forwarded by the fastest means availa-
ble to the. EOD control unit for distribution to 
intelligence personnel and other EOD units. A 
tentative render safe procedure (RSP) (for EOD 
use only) will be included whether it is necessary 
to render the item safe or not. When it is neces-
sary to render the item safe, the EOD team 
should obtain all essential information prior to 
performing a render safe procedure. This report 
alerts technical intelligence teams so that they 
may be dispatched to the site, and provides other 
EOD units with information on new items of ex-
plosive ordnance. 
{2) Complementary Technical Report (COM-
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TECH REP). These reports are prepared by tech-
nical intelligence teams or. in their absence, and 
when requested by the G2 or his representative, 
by EOD personnel. This report will be as complete 
and detailed as possible. When prepared by EOD 
personnel, it will be forwarded by the fas test 
means available through the EOD control unit to 
the technical intelligence company. 
5-14. Military Police Units 
a. Collection. As collection agencies, military 
police units and personnel, particularly criminal 
investigators, are well suited to assist in such 
functions as : 
(1) Collecting and reporting items of foreign 
materiel on the Foreign Materiel Requirements 
Listing. 
(2) Locating specific technical items of equip-
ment. 
(3) Locating individuals and activities 
within a specialized technical field. 
( 4) Reporting items of potential technical in-
telligence value obtained from prisoners of war 
(PW) and civilian internees. 
(5) Reporting items of potential value confis-
cated or captured in raids. 
b. Materiel Obtained by Military Police. The 
different items of foreign materiel subject to con-
fiscation from PW include arms; ammunition; 
military equipment (except mess equipment, 
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metal helmets, and protective masks); military 
documents. such as military codes and ciphers; 
pictures and maps or sketches of military installa-
tions or implements of war; and signal devices. 
All other property taken from prisoners is 
grouped in the category of retained or impounded 
property and must be accounted for or ultimately 
returned to the prisoner if the capturing forces 
assume custody. 
c. Marking of PW Materiel. Procedures for 
marking foreign materiel of potential technical 
intelligence value that is taken from PW should 
include means of positively identifying the mate-
riel with the PW (para 6-6, fig 6-2). This is nec-
essary because prisoners and materiel will often 
be evacuated through separate channels and accu-
rate identification of the PW will facilitate future 
location. This would also facilitate the identifica-
tion of certain property which must eventually be 
returned to the PW by regulations. 
5-15. CBR Reconnaissance Teams 
The CBR Reconnaissance Team, TOE 3-500, as-
signed to an armored cavalry regiment or equiva-
lent echelon and to higher headquarters, has the 
primary mission of performing CBR reconnais-
sance. Additional appropriate information on the 
capabilities, composition, functions, and employ-
ment of the CBR reconnaissance team may be 
found in FM 3-1. 
5-5 
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CHAPTER 6 
RECOVERY AND EVACUATION OF FO.REIGN EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS 
(STANAG 2084, SOLOG 94) 
Section I. 
6-1. Concept 
a. Within a theater of operations, captured 
items are exploited at predesignated collecting 
points at division, corps, field army, and theater. 
Technical intelligence collection teams are sent 
forward of the division collecting points to ex-
amine captured items at or near the scene of acqui-
sition and to arrange for evacuation if necessary. 
Captured items, except class V, can be evacuated 
directly from the division collecting point to the 
technical intelligence company at· field army for 
exploitation. Collecting points for class V ord-
nance should be either the conventional or special 
ammunition supply points (to include missiles). 
FM 9-47 contains information on special ammu-
nition. Detailed information for recovery and 
evacuation flow of Class V ordnance is contained 
in FM 9-14 and FM 9-15. FM 9-14 provides EOD 
services information. 
b. The immediate headquarters of the unit find-
ing or acquiring items of foreign materiel and 
related documents is responsible to obtain and 
provide prompt disposition instructions as to 
whether the items will be evacuated through tech-
nical intelligence or logistics channels, and to as-
sist the acquiring unit in safeguarding, recovery, 
and evacuation of the items, as· required. Techni-
cal intelligence elements are responsible to pro-
vide prompt jnstructions on the need for, and the 
evacuation of, foreign items for technical intelli-
gence purposes. They will perform on-site analy-
sis and are also responsible to exploit, secure, and 
store all items of foreign materiel while in techni-
cal channels. 
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c. Intelligence officers and staffs at all echelons 
are responsible to insure that prompt instructions 
concerning the need for, and evacuation of, for-
eign materiel fo.r technical intelligence are pro-
vided to the acquiring unit. They must coordinate 
with their logistics counterparts concerning the 
policies and procedures governing the recovery 
and evacuation of foreign materiel. They also pro-
vide supervision over the evacuation of foreign 
materiel through intelligence channels. 
6-2. Disposal and Transfer 
a. Items evaeuated through technical intelligence 
channels will be returned to logistics channels 
when no longer required for technical intelligence 
purposes. Before such transfer, however, a techni-
cal intelligence element must ascertain that there 
is no further requirement from higher echelons or 
other agencies for the item in question. 
b. Foreign air and naval materiel and related 
technical documents will be transferred to US 
Navy or US Air Force technical intelligence or 
logistics channels at the lowest practical level. 
Until transfer, such items will remain in Army 
technical (or logistics) channels, as appropriate. 
c. The acquisition of foreign materiel, in itself, 
will not necessarily vest title in the United States. 
This is true in the case of items acquired incident 
to belligerent or peace-keeping operations (e.g., 
acquired by capture or confiscation) where owner-
ship of forj:lign property (materiel) is regulated 
by international law. Where there is doubt, the 
matter should be referred to the Staff Judge Ad· 
vocate. 
Section II. RECOVERY. AND EVACUATION OF MATERIEL 
6-3. Collecting Points 
Collecting points are facilities to which aban-
doned or· unserviceable US and captured· foreign 
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materiel is evacuated for classification, segrega .. 
tion, and proper disposition. Collecting points op-
erate where needed throughout the theater of op-
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erations. In the field army area, one or more col-
lecting points are provided for each corps area 
and for the field army service area. These are 
generally operated by the Collection and Classifi-
cation Company (TOE 29-139). In the division 
areas, collecting points are operated by the divi-
sion maintenance battalion. Evacuation fl.ow 
through the collecting points is shown in figure 
6-1. Detailed information on recovery and. evacu-
ation procedures is contained in FM 29-24 and 
29-30. 
6-4. Material Recovery 
a. Responsibilities for recovery and evacuation 
of foreign materiel at various levels are similar to 
those for U.S. materiel. The discovery of items of 
foreign materiel. however, will be reported by the 
capturing unit through intelligence channels .. 
Items for which there are no disposition instruc-
tions should not be evacuated until coordinated 
with technical intelligence elements. The captur-
ing unit must submit a spot report (para 7-10) to 
the intelligence officer of its higher headquarters. 
The capturing unit may be directed to evacuate 
the item to the collection and classification com-
pany or guard it and leave it in place for on-site 
preliminary examination by technical intelligence 
personnel. When materiel does not have to remain 
in place for intelligence evaluation and the discov-
ery unit is incapable of evacuating it, the unit 
may request evacuation assistance directly from 
the command responsible for direct support main-
tenance. Evacuation may be direct from a mainte-
nance collecting point to the technical intelligence 
company at field army. 
b. Foreign materiel may be of value for techni-
cal intelligence purposes, or it may be utilized by 
friendly forces. Foreign materiel should be 
cleared from the battlefield or destroyed to pre-
vent recapture or reclamation by the enemy or by 
guerrilla forces. Technical intelligence elements of 
the military intelligence battalion and the intelli-
gence officers of all commands are interested in 
captured or abandoned items of foreign materiel. 
Procedures must be established for the screening 
and evacuation of materiel. Implementing instruc-
tions are published by subordinate commands in 
the form of directives and SOP. Items of foreign 
materiel being evacuated directly to the field army 
support area are reported through higher head-
quarters to the technical intelligence company and 
held until disposition instructions are provided or 
responsibility is assumed by the technical intelli-
gence company or another activity. Items which 
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are of no use either for technical intelligence or 
for equipping friendly forces are demilitarized 
and disposed of as directed by higher headquar-
ters. Captured medical materiel may be used to 
treat PW and indigenous personnel after such 
supplies have been declared safe by US medical 
authority. -
c. Transportation elements of supported units 
are responsible for transporting foreign materiel 
from collecting points with the assistance of 
maintenance units as required, based on instruc-
tions from technical intelligence elements. 
6-5. On-Site Analysis by Technical 
Intelligence Collection Teams 
a. The objective of on-site analysis (after for-
eign materiel is acquired) is to obtain information 
of immediate tactical value to combat forces. On-
site analysis also facilitates recovery of certain 
characteristics which are more difficult to deter-
mine once the configuration and/or interconnec-
tion of materiel has been disturbed. Information 
to be obtained includes the following: 
(1) Determination of equipment operational 
characteristics, performance, capabilities, and 
vulnerabilities. 
(2) Identification of new significant weapons. 
(3) Analysis for modifications. 
( 4) Possible countermeasures. 
(5) Identification and proper handling of ra-
dioactive materiel. 
b. In the event of acquisition of a large number 
of like terms of materiel, the technical intelligence 
collection teams must examine the materiel and 
obtain all available information relative to lot 
numbers, date of manufacture, and factory mark-
ings that may assist in providing information ·on 
the item. A sufficient number of items must be 
evacuated for detailed evaluation. The remaining 
items are then processed through normal evacua-
tion and/ or salvage supply channels. 
6-6. Marking and Tagging 
a. The capturing unit is responsible for tagging 
items of foreign materiel. To facilitate segrega-
tion, collection, analysis. and evacuation of mate-
riel for intelligence purposes, weather-resistant 
equipment tags, normally produced within the 
theater, are securely attached to the item itself 
and to the shipping container (fig 6-2 and 6-3). If 
weather-resistant tags are not available at the 
troop level, any materiel may be used as a tag as 
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long as pertinent capture data can be recorded. 
This responsibility must be clearly established by 
command SOP. 
b. An outgrowth of the capture of foreign 
equipment is the need for an effective "war tro-
phy" policy. Care must be taken to insure that 
"items wanted" are not retained as souvenirs nor 
destroyed unnecessarily by the capturing unit. 
Provisions should be made with the host country 
to insure that all firearms are properly registered 
and conform to existing firearm laws. 
c. Equipment tags accompany the materiel to 
its final destination. Article 103, Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, is printed on the reverse side of 
the tag to forestall tampering {fig 6-3). 
d. In addition to the establishment of proper 
safeguards, all military personnel should receive, 
in conjunction with intelligence training, instruc-
tion in equipment tagging and in the consequences 
of failure to execute this responsibility. Troops 
must be indoctrinated not to deface original 
markings on materiel at the time of its capture. 
e. Tagging, marking, crating, and preparation 
for shipment to CONUS is the major responsibil-
ity of the recovery and shipping section of the 
technical intelligence company in accordance with 
field army and theater policies. The section must 
depend upon field army support command ele-
ments for the preparation and shipment of bulky 
items. 
6-7. Evacuation Guidance 
The general plans, policies, and procedures for 
evacuation of all foreign materiel are prescribed 
by the joint/unified/theater and field army head-
quarters. These general plans are based upon DA 
and DOD policies and guidance. Each command 
echelon within the field army must insure that its 
plans are in accordance with field army directives 
and the overall field army technical intelligence 
plan. 
6-8. Recovery and Evacuation of Explosive 
Ordnance and CBR Munitions 
a. The primary interest of technical intelligence 
units in explosive foreign ordnance has been men-
tioned in paragraph 5-13. However, the assistance 
of EOD personnel in the examination, movement, 
and evacuation of explosive ordnance is manda-
tory. First-seen foreign ordnance items should be 
rendered safe by EOD personnel if possible. If 
this is not feasible, the item should be rendered 
safe in place by destructive methods which will 
minimize damage to the item. Complete photo-
graphic coverage of the item in place, both before 
and after destructive sating should be obtained. 
Foreign, explosive-type chemical or biological am-
munition, after being rendered safe, is forwarded 
through technical intelligence channels to the gen-
eral chemical laboratory for extraction of samples 
of the agent filling. Extracted chemical agent sam-
ples are analyzed by the chemical laboratory, and 
extracted biological agents samples are forwarded 
to a medical laboratory for identification. 
b. Unidentifiable items and those required by 
higher authority should be recovered whenever 
possible, even at considerable risk. Recovery of 
components or fragments of such items may be 
equally important. Recovery is invaluable to tech-
nical intelligence and to CONUS-based research 
elements in the development of disposal methods 
and tools. 
c. The following guidelines apply to the recov-
ery and evacuation of explosive ordnance: 
{1) New or unknown types of foreign explo-
sive ordnance recovered by EOD personnel must 
be turned over to technical intelligence units for 
disposition. Security classification of the items 
and their components will not be lower than 
SECRET. 
(2) Foreign nuclear weapons or components, 
to include sabotage devices, are evacuated through 
technical intelligence channels. Security classifica-
tion of such items will not be lower than SECRET 
RESTRICTED DATA. 
(3) Security and technical escorts are re-. 
quired to provide safety control for shipments of 
nuclear, chemical, biological, and other hazardous 
items of explosive ordnance. Within the field 
army, technical intelligence personnel will coordi-
nate with appropriate staffs to establish the need 
and arrange for technical escorts. For shipments 
to CONUS, the theater intelligence officer deter-
mines the need and arranges for technical escorts. 
( 4) Collection of technical intelligence data 
will in many instances entail dismantling of the 
ordnance and stripping of fuzes and other danger-
ous components for analysis and evaluation. 
These operations will be performed only by expe-
rienced EOD personnel. Dismantling and strip-
ping are conducted only in response to a specific 
requirement for such action which has been 
placed through technical intelligence or EOD 
staffs. 
(5) Captured mines and boobytraps should 
be analyzed or tested only by trained weapons/ 
munitions specialists. Extreme caution must be 
exercised when taut wire and pull releases or sim-
ilar releases are encountered. Unusual mecha-
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ARTICLE 103, UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 
a. All persons subject to this code shall secure all public 
property taken from the enemy for the service of the United 
States, and shall give notice and turn over to the proper au-
thority, without delay, all captured or abandoned property in 
their possession, custody or control. 
b. Any person subject to this code who: (1) fails to carry 
out the duties prescribed in subdivision {a) of this article; 
(2) buys, sells, trades, or in any way deals in or disposes of 
captured or abandoned property, whereby he shall receive or 
expect any profit, benefit, or advantage to himself or another 
directly or indirectly connected with him; or (3) engages in 
looting or pillaging; shall be punished as a court-martial may 
direct. 
Figure 6-9. Reverse side of equipment marking tag-Article 103. 
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nisms used as boobytraps should be· reported im-
mediately by the finding unit through intelligence 
channels to the technical intelligence company by 
spot report. Countermeasures must be coordinated 
with EOD personnel. Final disposal of explosive 
components or hazardous materials associated 
with such devices and with recovered ammunition 
is the responsibility of EOD personnel. 
6-9. Security and Escort 
Many items of foreign materiel acquired by U.S. 
Forces and . determined to be of technical intelli-
gence value will require safeguarding in storage 
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as well as during evacuation. Such items may be 
sensitive· due to their criticality or because of a 
U.S. classification assigned (para 6-8, 6-12, and 
7-13). Initially, the finding unit is responsible for 
safeguarding materiel, based on instructions from 
the next higher headquarters, to prevent looting, 
loss, destruction, or recapture by the enemy. Mili-
tary police elements normally provide physical se-
curity at storage and during evacuation when for-
eign materiel is sensitive or of special value. Par-
ticular attention must be paid to the peculiarities 
of nuclear weapons escort and the technical escort 
requirement for CBR materiel. 
Section Ill. RECOVERY AND EVACUATION OF TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS 
6-10. General 
Doctrine for the handling of captured documents 
is contained in FM 30-15, Intelligence Interroga-
tion. Technical publications and manuscripts 
which are of concern to technical intelligence, are 
those documents usually found with materiel 
which relate to technical design or operation of 
the materiel. Such technical documents may also 
be acquired separately from the materiel they 
concern (e.g., from PW, from files in overrun 
areas, found on the battlefield). It is essential that 
technical intelligence personnel coordinate closely 
with interrogation elements to facilitate exchange 
of information. · 
6-11. Evacuation 
a. Technical documents should be evacuated 
with the related materiel. If the operational situa-
tion prevents evacuation of the materiel, the docu-
ments should be identified with the materiel by 
means of an attached sheet marked "TECHDOC" 
listing the precise location, time and circumstan-
ces of capture, and. a description, as detailed as 
possible, of the materiel. Adequate and sufficient 
photographs of the equipment should be produced 
and evacuated with the document. 
b. Documents obtained through liaison with in-
terrogation elements should be accompanied by a 
report of pertinent information obtained from 
PW. 
c. The general guidance in this manual concern-
ing recovery and evacuation of materiel pertains 
also to technical documents. However, the divers-e 
nature of documents acquired and their frequent 
interest to various agencies and commands dictate 
the necessity for technical intelligence personnel 
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to be familiar with the categories of documents 
and appropriate handling procedures stipulated in 
FM 30-15. 
6-12. Recovery and Evacuation of 
Cryptographic and Other Electronic 
Equipment and Documents 
a. Special provisions must be prescribed by 
technical intelligence units for handling all cap-
tured communications and electronic equipment 
and documents. This equipment and related docu-
ments must be classified CONFIDENTIAL or 
higher and designated "crypto," and tagged and 
evacuated to the nearest USASA element as soon 
as practicable. Examples are as follows : 
(1) Speech security devices. 
(2) Teletypewriter security devices. 
(3) Data security devices. 
( 4) Off-line encryption devices. 
(5) Documents, manuals, circuitry diagrams, 
and all ancillary equipment. 
b. The following items must be classified 
SECRET or higher and evcuated to the nearest 
USASA element: 
( 1 ) Key lists. 
(2) Code books and sheets. 
(3) Encrypted messages. 
(4) Cryptographic data and items. 
(5) Coµimunications-electronics operation in-
structions. 
(6) Communications-electronics standing in-
structions. 
(7) Map coordinate overlays. 
c. The following items are of immediate interest 
to EW units as well as USASA units and should 
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be classiified in accordance with a or b above. 
These ii terms may be evacuated to either USASA 
or EW units with the other being informed of the 
nature and disposition of the items: 
( 1) Communications-electronics operating in-
structions. 
6-'8 
(2) Map coordinate overlays. 
(3) Order of battle information of enemy 
units which operate electromagnetic transmitting 
or receiving equipment. 
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CHAPTER 7 
PROCESSING, DISSEMINATION, AND USE 
(STANAG 2084, 2097; SOLOG 94) 
Section I. 
7-1. General 
a. The wide range of technical proficiency nec-
essary for mission accomplishment will not al-
ways be found within the technical intelligence 
collection elements or the technical intelligence 
company. Assistance from medical, ordnance, sig-
nal, engineer, and other specialized agencies and 
units will have to be sought. Within the technical 
intelligence company itself, a coordinated effort of 
diverse specialists is necessitated by the broad 
range of the technical equipment/materiel 
acquired. 
b. Processing of technical information involves 
recording, evaluation, and interpretation of the 
collected information. In urgent situations techni-
cal information can be processed as received with-
out waiting to collect supporting information, 
particularly if background files and an adequate 
data base have been estaiblished and maintained. 
For example, information/intelligence containing 
data on foreign missiles capable of carrying nu-
clear, chemical, or biological warheads, the early 
use of which is a probability, is so urgent that no 
delay between acquisition of the information and 
dissemination can be permitted. 
7-2. Recording 
Technical information and data are recorded in 
journals, workbooks, and technical intelligence 
files to facilitate evaluation and interpretation. 
Recording involves reducing information and data 
to written or graphic form and aids technical ana-
lysts in grouping related items of information. It 
expedites the preparation and dissemination of 
technical intelligence reports, however, the re-
cording step may be omitted to permit rapid eval-
uation, interpretation, and immediate dissemina-
tion of urgent tactical information to the unit(s) 
concerned. 
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7-3. Evaluation 
a. Evaluation includes determining the perti-
nence of the information, the reliability of the 
source and the agency from which the informa-
tion was derived, and the accuracy or credibility 
of the information. The system of evaluation is 
described in FM 30-5 and has been standardized 
for use by NA TO forces and other allies. 
(1) Evaluation involves systematically ar-
ranging all pieces of information and comparing 
known data with the current state of the art, a 
continuing process at all appropriate echelons. As 
technical information flows to the technical intel-
ligence company, it must be associated with all 
related data including previous technical reports. 
(2) Technical evaluation must take into con-
sideration the industrial and scientific base and 
capabilities of foreign nations. Evaluation esti-
mates based solely on US standards must be 
avoided inasmuch as foreign equipment and mate-
riel may appear wholly inferior when judged only 
by US standards. 
b. Technical information received from intelli-
gence sources and agencies will consist primarily 
of reports on the use of new or modified items of 
foreign materiel, the capture of materiel and doc-
uments, and extracts of technical information 
from intelligence reports. These reports normally 
will have been given an evaluation by the collect-
ing agency and/or the appropriate intelligence 
staff. Such evaluations notwithstanding, technical 
intelligence personnel are obligated to re-evaluate 
each item of information based on their technical 
data base and technical experience. 
c. Technical evaluation includes the following 
considerations : 
(1) Does the information concern foreign 
materiel known or suspected to be in use in the 
area of operations? 
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(2) Will the information have an immediate 
effect on the command mission? 
(3) Is the use of new materiel by the enemy 
indicated, or are increased enemy capabilities 
indicated? 
(4) What is the immediate effect on forces in 
combat? 
(5) Does the information have present or fu-
ture value; if so, to whom? 
7-4. Interpretation 
Interpretation consists of analysis, integration, 
and deduction. It is the mental process of deter-
mining the importance of information, integrat-
ing this with other technical data, and making a 
deduction as to the value and significance of the 
information. 
a. AnaTysis. Analysis requires a thorough 
knowledge of foreign equipment and materiel to 
include past technological trends, developments, 
and tactical doctrine on equipment use. It involves 
more detailed research as the volume of technical 
date increases. Analysis within the technical intel-
ligence company is centralized in the evaluation 
and analysis platoon. 
b. Integration. 
(1) Integration is the combining of numerous 
isolated elements of technical information with 
other technical data to form one or more logical 
conclusions. Technical intelligence conclusions are 
made with pri.mary emphasis upon the tactical 
m1ss10n. This phase of interpretation requires 
judgment, experience, varied background knowl-
edge, and knowledge of scientific methods. Formu-
lated technical hypotheses (conclusions) should be 
tested for validity and reliability. 
(2) The technical intelligence company must 
integrate the technical information provided by 
all intelligence collection agencies to construct an 
objective assessment of foreign capabilities. 
c. Deduction. Deduction, the last step in inter-
pretation, consists of deriving meaning from the 
hypotheses that have been developed and tested. 
Deduction provides answers as to the meaning 
and significance of technical intelligence and data 
in relation to the tactical situation and area of 
operation. 
7-5. Processing by Intelligence Staff 
Sections 
The processing discussed above does not replace 
the normal intelligence processing within the G2 
staff elements. Technical intelligence is integrated 
with all other intelligence by the G2 staff and, as 
one facet of the intelligence product, enables the 
G2 staff to arrive at an estimate of the capabili-
ties, limitations, and future courses of action of 
foreign military forces. It is re-emphasized that, 
as in all steps of technical intelligence production, 
close coordination between the technical intelli-
gence company and the organic technical intelli-
gence element of the G2 staff is mandatory. 
Section 11. ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE. PRODUCTION 
7-6. Considerations 
a. The producers of technical intelligence must 
keep in mind that actual and potential foreign 
capabilities, limitations, and probable courses of 
action are under continuous development at the 
field army, theater, and national levels. Based 
upon the technical intelligence produced, new re-
quirements for US equipment, doctrine and coun-
termeasures may evolve. Intelligence that will as-
sist in the preparation of new US military equip-
ment, doctrine, and countermeasures must be con-
sidered by the technical intelligence producer dur-
ing the entire technical intelligence production 
cycle. 
b. Factors to be considered by tactical technical 
intelligence units and staff officers include, but ar:e 
not limited to, the following : 
(1) Effects of terrain and weather. 
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(2) Characteristics, performance, and effec-
tiveness of materiel. 
(3) Effectiveness of countermeasures against 
foreign equipment. 
(4) New design features and modifications of 
old and/or new equipment. 
(5) Overall combat intelligence requirements. 
7-7. Technical Reference Library 
a. Technical intelligence processing, research, 
analysis, and evaluation cannot be conducted 
without a current data base. The need for specific 
data requirements, performance characteristics, 
equipment descriptions, and operational limita-
tions of materiel, and the extensive need for inte-
gration and collation of technical information cov-
ering wide technical areas necessitate the estab-
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lishment of a technical intelligence reference li-
brary by the technical intelligence company. As a 
minimum, the technical library should include--
(1) Technical Bulletins. 
(2) Foreign Equipment Handbooks (by coun-
try). 
(3) Foreign Materiel Catalog (FOMCAT) 
TB 381-5-series. 
(4) DIA Scientific and Technical Intelligence 
Registers. 
(5) Organizational and Logistical Data 
Handbooks. 
(6) Enemy tactics and operational concept 
studies. 
(7) Technical equipment documents and 
studies. 
(8) Order of battle handbooks. 
(9) Foreign Tables of Organization and 
Equipment. 
(10) Foreign materiel exploitation reports. 
(11) Equipment vulnerability studies. 
(12) Threat studies and assessments. 
b. This technical reference library will provide 
not only accurate and timely technical informa-
tion and intelligence references, but will serve to 
aid interested field army units and agencies with 
limited and specialized technical information and 
thereby· reduce the need for direct technical sup-
port. Selection of library references should be 
based on the needs of combat, combat support, 
and combat service support users and field army 
requirements. 
7-8. Use of Experts and/or Organizations 
a. The technical intelligence company will some-
times require assistance from military and/or 
civilian personnel or organizations to assist in the 
technical analysis of materiel to fulfill a special 
tactical or strategic mission. This may occur when 
the expertise needed to solve a highly technical 
and complex problem is not available within the 
technical intelligence company. Therefore, main-
taining an up-to-date "Technical Expert File" (of 
names) will prove invaluable. When utilized, these 
"experts" should work directly with the technical 
intelligence company, and must possess the proper 
security clearance; they should be used as consult-
ants/ advisers for a short period of time. The most 
important criterion governing the use of these in-
dividuals is that such service should normally be 
voluntary. 
b. Experts whose training could be of special 
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assistance to technical intelligence units for anal-
ysis and production services include- . 
(1) Ammunition maintenance technicians. 
(2) Guided missile maintenance personnel. 
(3) Nuclear weapons specialists. 
( 4) Ammunition supply specialists. 
( 5) Data processing personnel. 
(6) COMINT, ELINT, ESM, and ECM per-
sonnel. 
(7) Cryptographic personnel. 
(8) Communications security analysts. 
(9) Optical specialists. 
(10) Explosive ordnance. specialists, 
(11) Petroleum product analysts. 
(12) Guided missile propellant and explosive 
specialists. 
(13) Geographers, geologists, and/or con-
struction specialists. 
(14) Photography experts. 
(15) Communications specialists. 
(16) Weapons systems analysts. 
(17) Chemists, physicists, and biologists. 
(18) Radar specialists. 
(19) Indigenous surgeons and medical spe-
cialists. 
(20) Transportation operations and move-
ments specialists. 
(21) USASA TAREX personnel. 
(22) Cover and deception personnel. 
(23) Counterdeception personnel. 
7-9. Photography 
a. Photographs, diagrams, and charts (valuable 
sources of permanent information for technical 
analysis and evaluation) are used by technical in-
telligence analysts to supplement their finished re-
ports. Photographs of materie1 acquired in fast-
moving tactical situations can be sent to the rear 
by technical intelligence collection teams prior to 
evacuation of the actual equipment. The photo-
graph may be the only item available to the ana-
lyst if the equipment becomes lost, damaged, de-
stroyed, or recaptured. Technical intelligence 
collection activities at all echelons must be cogni-
zant that one of their first responsibilities should 
be to photograph, diagram, or sketch in place all 
items of intelligence value. As many different an-
gles as possible should be portrayed. 
b. Photographs must be analyzed, evaluated, 
and compared. They should be accompanied by 
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appropriate written descriptions to enhance their 
value to the analyst. Skill and training of the ana-
lyst are essential to maximum exploitation of pho-
tographs. All photographs should contain a ruler, 
scale, or other measuring comparison to portray 
relative size of an object. 
c. Long-range reconnaissance patrols, special 
forces operational detachments, and other intelli-
gence collection elements may photograph special 
items of technical intelligence interest when oper-
ating behind enemy lines. Use of such units for 
technical intelligence missions must be coordi-
nated at the appropriate echelon, and personnel 
must be thoroughly briefed on technical intelli-
gence requirements prior to dispatch. 
Section Ill. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS 
7-10. Reports 
Six types of technical intelligence reports are used 
in technical intelligence collection and production. 
These are-
a. Spot Report. This oral or written report (FM 
30-5) is prepared by the acquiring units and/or 
intermediate command echelons to report rapidly, 
by electrical or other means, the acquisition of 
foreign materiel and technical documents. Such 
reports are forwarded through intelligence chan~ 
nels to the technical intelligence company. Corps 
may use this report as a basis for dispatch of 
technical intelligence collection teams if none are 
in the acquisition area. The basic items of this 
report should include as a minimum : 
(1) Who is reporting (unit). 
(2) What is being reported. 
(3) Where and when (coordinates). 
( 4) How much materiel. 
(5) Condition of materiel. 
(6) Whom to contact. 
b. Preliminary Technical Report (PRE-
TECHREP). This report is prepared and trans-
mitted by the quickest possible means through 
intelligence channels on all captured foreign ma-
teriel. It is prepared by corps technical intelligence 
collection teams or the capturing unit. The pre-
liminary report contains a general description of 
the equipment and places emphasis on alerting 
tactical units to significant technical information 
of immediate tactical importance. It is prepared in 
the format shown below: 
(1) Date found, location (map reference). 
(2) Type of equipment and quantity. 
(3) Origin. 
( 4) Brief description with distinguishing 
marks. 
(5) Technical characteristics with an imme-
diate value. 
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(6) Name of the commander of capturing 
unit. 
(7) Time and origin of the message. 
(8) Tentative RSP (for EOD use only). 
c. Complementary Technical Reports (COM-
TECHREP). These reports are prepared by tech-
nical intelligence collection teams operating 
throughout a corps area in support of corps ele-
ments and supplements information in the PRE-
TECHREP. The formats of these reports are given 
in appendix D. When the situation does not permit 
Air Force technical intelligence teams to arrive at 
the scene of captured or downed enemy aircraft 
prior to destruction, recapture or loss; Army tech-
nical intelligence personnel will initially examine 
and submit COMTECHREP Type A. This report 
will then constitute the only information which 
can be provided to Air Force technical intelligence. 
In the event items of enemy navy materiel are 
acquired, Type A report format can be modified 
for reporting such acquisition. 
d. Detailed Technical Report (DETECHREP). 
This report is the responsibility of the technical 
intelligence company at field army. No format can 
be specified because of the diversity of its content. 
e. Technical Document Report (TECHDOC). 
This report is prepared on all captured enemy 
technical documents such as maintenance hand-
books, operation manuals, drawings, and sketches. 
No format is prescribed. 
f. Special Technical Report. This report is pre-
pared as required by field army G2 staff elements 
and higher echelons to provide input to studies 
and plans. It contains special information on 
items of significant intelligence interest. No for-
mat is prescribed and content is governed by the 
nature of the technical intelligence desired. 
7-11. Nomenclature 
All technical intelligence report nomenclature 
should be, to the extent possible, in consonance 
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with overall unified/joint/theater policies and 
guidance. Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc army 
weapons has been NATO-standardized (STANAG 
2097). Principles of this nomenclature are as fol-
lows: 
a. Nomenclature of the country of origin for 
Soviet Bloc army weapons, equipment, and vehi-
cles is used whenever it is known. If unknown, a 
short descriptive title will be devised '.lnd used as 
an interim measure only. Short interim titles will 
be issued by higher headquarters (theater, joint, 
or unified command) as soon as possible after 
sighting details have been received. Description 
titles, as well as interim titles, should include the 
country of design and manufacture (when the 
country of manufacture is different from the 
country of design) or the best estimate thereof; 
should include a question mark after the country 
name, when appropriate; and should become pro-
gressively more speicific. e.g.: 
(1) E. German ( ?) Hand Grenade M 1960. 
(2) E. German copy of Sov Hand Grenade 
M 1960. 
(3) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand 
Grenade M 1960. 
(4) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand 
Grenade A.KG-3. 
When the manner in which information was ob-
tained warrants protection of a confidential 
source or method, the originating (reporting) 
agency will assign an appropriate security classi-
fication. 
b. Nomenclature for any given piece of equip-
ment will include an adequate description to 
show: 
(1) The role of the equipment, e.g., medium 
tank, howitzer, antitank gun. 
(2) Type of chassis, when applicable (as-
sumed to be wheeled unless otherwise stated), 
e.g., half-tracked, tracked. 
c. The caliber of all weapons will be referred to 
in millimeters and will always be placed immedi-
ately preceding the description of the weapon. 
The abbreviation "mm" for millimeters will be 
used. 
d. The year when the equipment was first seen 
or known to exist will be indicated by use of the 
letter M and the four figures of the year. These 
figures will become a part of the title, e.g., 100-
mm field Gun M 1964. 
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e. The items to be included in the title of each 
group of weapons and equipment, as well as ex-
amples of these titles are shown in appendix E. 
7-12. Report Credibility 
All reports produced by the technical intelligence 
company should bear the following statement on 
the cover to give official credence to the report: 
This is a United States Army Technical 
Intelligence Report. The data contained 
herein was derived through limited test-
ing, analysis, and examination utilizing 
US Army Laboratory and test facilities. 
7-13. Security Considerations 
a. Classification. Technical reports from the 
technical intelligence company are classified in 
accordance with appropriate Army regulations in 
the 380-series. When equipment is acquired 
through a friendly foreign government, the spe-
cific security classification assigned by that gov-
ernment must be adhered to and given equivalent 
protection by being assigned to Group-1 in accord-
ance with AR 380-6. 
b. Security Policies. 
(1) At times, technical intelligence involves 
sensitive security materiel and will require strin-
gent security controls by the technical intelligence 
unit. A unit technical intelligence SOP on security 
is mandatory in order to provide a security 
framework adequate to support operational re-
quirements. The technical intelligence SOP must 
be precise, yet flexible. The following guidelines 
are provided : 
(a) Requirements for sensitive technical 
intelligence materiel in support of assigned mis-
sions must be carefully planned and should be 
revised periodically. 
(b) Information and materiel should be 
disseminated on a need-to-know basis in accord-
ance with specific security regulations. 
(c) Care must be taken not to ove·rclassify. 
(2) Indigenous personnel may be utilized in 
some situations. Because of the sensitive nature 
of many areas of technical intelligence, informa-
tion should be released to such personnel only 
after: 
(a) It has been determined that release of 
the information is in the best interests of the 
United States. 
( b) The security requirements imposed by 
security regulations and procedures have been 
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complied with concerning release of sensitive in-
formation. 
( c) Care has been taken to furnish only 
that information for which an explicit need-to-
know has definitely been established. 
Section IV. DISSEMINATION AND USE 
7-14. Dissemination 
a. Methods. Timely dissemination of technical 
intelligence reports is of maximum importance to 
tactical, combat support, and combat service sup-
port commanders. The methods used to dissemi-
nate technical intelligence depend upon the detail 
and urgency of the intelligence and upon the in-
tended users. Primary consideration must be 
given to the needs of the tactical users. The spot 
report, PRETECHREP, arid COMTECHREP are 
used normally for initial reports of acquisition of 
materiel and supplementary information. The 
most common means of disseminating processed 
technical intelligence are: 
(1) Detailed technical reports. 
(2) Technical intelligence bulletins. 
(3) Technical reviews and summaries. 
(4) Special technical reports. 
(5) Special technical studies and estimates. 
(6) Handbooks. 
( 7) Technical pamphlets. 
( 8) Briefings. 
(9) Liaison visits. 
b. Dissemination of Explosive Ordnance Infor-
mation. Technical intelligence on explosive ord-
nance may be disseminated from any level where 
it originates. Pertinent extracts should be pro-
vided to EOD personnel at all levels to permit 
development of new EOD tools and render safe 
procedures, as required. EOD control units will 
insure that pertinent information contained in 
PRETECHREPS and COMTECHREPS is dis-
seminated to each EOD unit under its control and 
to other EOD control units if appropriate. The 
Foreign Science and Technology Center, US Army 
Materiel Command, makes available foreign am-
munitiOn items, reports, and evaluations required 
for study and use in developing EOD tools and 
render safe procedures. Secrecy of EOD tools and 
render safe procedures is important to prevent 
the enemy from learning the development of 
effective disarming procedures. 
7-15. Use of Technical Intelligence 
a. The user units and agencies are even more 
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diverse than the technical fields concerned. It is 
beyond the scope of this manual to specify even 
the general requirements of various units and 
agencies. The requirements for higher echelons, 
intelligence staff sections, and commanders have 
been discussed. All units and agencies must famil-
iarize themselves with the capabilities and limita-
tions of technical intelligence, and must insure 
that their technical intelligence needs are made 
known to higher, lower, and adjacent headquar-
ters. The advantages of coordination and liaison 
to insure receipt of pertinent technical intelli-
gence reports and information cannot be overem-
phasized. Technical intelligence personnel of units 
and intelligence staffs must develop f amiliariza-
tion with the technical needs of the many differ-
ent units. It must also be recognized that it is a 
rare technical item that is of interest to only one 
unit or agency. 
b. Examples of specific technical intellfgence in-
terests are as follows : 
(1) Combat arms unit commanders have a 
continuing interest in all implements of war 
which may be used against the front line Soldier. 
Examples of items of particular interest are new 
weapons and ammunition, communications equip-
ment, offensive or defensive devices or weapons, 
boobytraps, antihelicopter devices, grenades, anti-
tank weapons and fortifications, and enemy armor 
characteristics. It is obvious that some or an of 
these items will also be of interest to civil affairs 
units, EOD, and others. 
(2) S2/G2 and military intelligence· units 
have a continuing interest in any enemy innova-
tions. To produce accurate intelligence estimates 
and summaries for the commander, the latest 
enemy capabilities and technical battlefield ad-
vancements must be of prime interest. 
(3) SIGINT/ESM units have a continuing 
interest in obtaining technical intelligence. The 
planning and conduct of COMINT, ELINT, 
SIGSEC, and EW requires detailed information 
concerning the technical characteristics of the 
enemy electromagnetic environment, the doctrinal 
aspects concerning employment and deployment 
of enemy forces, and the current operational envi-
ronment. 
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CHAPTER 8 
STABILITY OPERATIONS 
Section I. 
8-1. General 
a. The scope of insurgent warfare may encom-
pass elite and professionally trained military 
forces as well as local guerrillas or part-time fight-
ers rind noncombatants. There will be substantial 
differences in armament, organization, training, 
equipment and overall effectiveness. Technical in-
telligence collectors and analysts must recognize 
these differences in their analyses. Familiarity 
with insurgent tactics, doctrine, and organization 
will greatly enhance the technical analysis and 
evaluation capabilities of the technical intelligence 
unit. 
b. Technical intelligence personnel must be 
thoroughly familiar with the characteristics, ca·pa-
bilities, and performance of the small arms and 
weapons originating in many friendly and un-
friendly nations. The insurgent usually has a lim-
ited capability to perform modifications to weap-
ons and materiel. If these modifications are not 
carefully analyzed and evaluated, their signifi-
cance and the conclusions drawn can be mislead-
ing. Technical intelligence derived during stability 
operations often has serious national and political 
consequences; it must, therefore, be accurate. 
8-2. Special Censiderettions 
a. Technical intelligence emphasis, goals, and 
priorities in stability operations will differ 
slightly from those in limited and general conflict. 
The basic principles of technical intelligence re-
main unchanged. However, some procedures may 
vary and additional considerations will be neces-
sary in applying these principles. Military units, 
for example, may be dispersed for independent/ 
decentralized operations. Movement of technical 
intelligence personnel must be by the fastest 
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means available. Evacuation of foreign materiel 
must be performed by the most secure means 
available, usually by air, to prevent recapture or 
loss. The insurgent's materiel normally is less so-
phisticated in the early phases of internal conflict 
than that of a conventional enemy; their wea-
ponry consists primarily of small arms, automatic 
weapons, and mortars obtained from friendly, 
neutral, and hostile nations. Such equipment is 
often augmented by primitive, but nevertheless 
effective, weapons such as crossbows, mantraps, 
and sharpened stakes. 
b. Arms caching and weapons smuggling are 
frequently resorted to by the insurgent. Arms 
caches may be of political and tactical signifi-
cance. Arms caches and logistical stores should be 
carefully analyzed and evaluated for technical in-
telligence, usually in a combined effort with the 
host country. The discovery of arms caches, when 
carefully exploited by functionally integrated 
technical teams, may lead to valuable intelligence 
about the overall insurgent tactical situation. 
Normally all captured materiel becomes the prop-
erty of the host country, and for this reason com-
bined operations, liaison, and coordination are im~ 
portant to insure full exploitation. The disposition 
of foreign materiel may be governed by status-of-
forces or other agreements, thus complicating the 
collection and analysis problems. As in a conven-
tional situation, close coordination of technical in-
telligence personnel with military units and all 
U.S.· government departments and agencies en-
gaged in collection is important. Combined (US/ 
host country) technical intelligence operations are 
particularly effective in improving the overall 
collection capability due to the language ability 
and area knowledge of the host country military 
personnel. 
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Section II. 
8-3. Technical Intelligence Emphasis 
a. In stability operations, technical intelligence 
personnel perform the normal duties described 
for conventional operations, but particular em-
phasis must be placed on the following: 
(1) Training host country combat personnel, 
as necessary, in technical intelligence collection 
and evacuating procedures. 
(2) Coordinating technical intelligence mat-
ters with other services having a technical intelli-
gence interest and with the host country. 
(3) Assisting in the organization and devel-
opment of a host country technical intelligence 
capability, if required. 
( 4) Performing increased on-site technical 
intelligence analysis and evaluation of enemy ma-
teriel. 
(5) Providing technical advice and assistance 
to host country military technical intelligence per-
sonnel, as required. 
(6) Assisting in adapting ideas and tech-
niques of insurgents for use by US Forces. 
b. Equally important for the technical intelli-
gence analyst and the intelligence community is 
the ever-present danger of capture of friendly 
weapons and equipment. An examination of the 
serial numbers of recaptured weapons will reveal 
which friendly unit lost the item; when, and possi-
bly to whom. The movement of the enemy unit 
may possibly be traced. . Coordination throughout 
the intelligence community will assist in deter-
mining whether the item was held by the captur-
ing enemy unit because of obvious and known 
needs for the materiel or whether the item might 
Section Ill. 
8-6. General 
a. Prior to initial commitment of US combat 
forces, the early detection and identification of 
materiel used by hostile forces assume paramount 
importance. Identification of outside logistical 
sources of supply is imperative and assists in the 
determination of diplomatic action, overall strat-
egy, force structure, and military equipment which 
should be deployed for successful mission accom-
plishment. 
b. The capabilities and knowledge of US Mili-
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have been transferred to another enemy unit with 
greater need for the specific item. 
8-4. Role of the Unit Intelligence Adviser 
a, The intelligence adviser plays a basic role in 
technical intelligence collection. He coordinates 
host country requests for technical intelligence 
support, and provides technical intelligence 
advice. He also informs US intelligence staffs 
when significant discoveries of insurgent materiel 
or arms caches are made by the unit which he 
advises. Technical intelligence collection/ analyst 
personnel must keep the unit intelligence adviser 
informed of important guerrilla weaponry devel· 
opments. In addition, they must help the adviser. 
in maintaining a technical intelligence items 
wanted list. 
b. Since the unit intelligence adviser is respon-
sible for advising and training host country forces 
in all aspects of intelligence, to include technical 
intelligence, a mutual fl.ow of technical informa-
tion between the adviser and advisee is ·highly 
advantageous. Mutually defined goals and objec-
tives between adviser and advisee are essential. 
8-5. Combat Service Support Role 
If and when the insurgency movement progresses, 
technical intelligence becomes more conventional 
in its support of tactical operations. Technical in-
telligence also assumes its normal role in combat 
service support. The establishment of a combined 
US and host country technical intelligence center 
may become advisable. In this event, the channel-
ing of technical intelligence reports and dissemi-
nation of processed technical intelligence should 
be precisely established by SOP. 
PROCEDURES 
tary Attaches, Military Assistance Advisory 
Groups, or Military Missions present in a foreign 
country experiencing insurgency can supplement 
the technical intelligence data base and facilitate 
initiation of the U.S. military technical intelli-
gence collection and analysis effort. 
8-7. Analysis 
a, Technical intelligence collection and analysis 
becomes more complicated in stability operations 
inasmuch as the combined political or military 
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objective often is more than merely seizing and 
holding terrain. Information on the technical 
characteristics of insurgent weapons must be con-
tinuously updated and expanded as the weapons 
or modifications appear. When a blockade is used 
to stop the flow of arms and ammunition to the 
insurgent, technical intelligence analysts must be 
particularly thorough in collection, analysis, and 
evaluation. For example, supply shortages and 
small changes in the chemical composition of pro-
pellants and demolitions might be indicators of 
the potential effectiveness of the blockade. 
b. It is imperative for political/military pur-
poses that technical intelligence personnel keep 
abreast of outside military assistance furnished 
the insurgent such as modern air defense missiles, 
guns, propellants, communications-electronics 
equipment, and petroleum products. For example, 
analysis of new missile propellants may give vital 
indications of enemy tactical capabilities. 
8-8. Investigative Data 
a. The technical intelligence collection teams 
have a responsibility to conduct weapon and am-
munition cache investigations and make reports 
thereon. Numerous caches, depots, salvage points, 
and small. factories may be discovered over a pe-
riod of time and should be exploited to the extent 
possible. The weapons and ammunition discovered 
may be a mixture from numerous nations, and 
statistical data must be maintained on all weap-
ons, ammunition, and supplies captured or found 
by US and friendly forces. 
b. One of the most important problems facing 
technical intelligence specialists will be planning 
for the exploitation of arms caches. Priorities 
must be established with primary consideration 
given to tactical needs. If the number of caches 
discovered is so great as to cause the involvement 
of all technical intelligence specialists, exploita-
tion of caches will have to be on a selective basis. 
The entire analysis effort can be materially as-
sisted by proper troop orientation on all aspects 
of technical intelligence, close coordination with 
major tactical headquarters, and placement of em-
phasis on the items wanted list. 
c. Tunnels and excavations are frequeptly used 
by the insurgents to provide protection for per-
sonnel and supplies and may contain a wide vari-
ety of potential intelligence information that 
should be collected. The fallowing checklist should 
be used by tactical units in submitting tunnel in-
formation reports : 
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(1) Location (coordinates). 
(2) Evaluation of construction. 
( 3) Specialized underground areas (class. 
room, training). 
(4) Installation of communications facilities. 
(a) Internal to internal. 
( b) Internal to external. 
( c) Use of special antennas. 
(5) Power available. 
(6) Alternate/emergency power system. 
(7) Storage facilities (effect of weather on). 
(8) Assessment of construction quality of in-
ternal operational facilities (shops, toolmaking, 
repairs). 
(9) General assessment of health facilities. 
(a) Waste disposal. 
(b) Water facilities. 
(c) Contamination. 
(d) Care of sick and wounded. 
( e) Assessment of medical standards. 
(10) Assessment of training facilities (if ap-
plicable). 
(11) Measures taken against severe weather. 
(12) Assessment of political propaganda in-
doctrination (documents, newsposters, magazines, 
printing presses). 
(13) Evaluation of use of environmental re-
sources. 
(14) Evaluation of local/commercial re-
sources (lumber, cotton). 
(15) Special items of interest. 
(16) Recreation facilities. 
(17) Assessment of defensive areas. 
(18) Internal security or warning devices. 
(19) Assessment of intelligence or intelU-
gence-related activities. 
(20) New field expedients (of major and con-
stant interest). 
(21) Neutralization action (i.e., destroyed, 
partially destroyed, contamination with CS). 
d. Information on the use of primitive weapons, 
such as poisonous spikes, crossbows, and dead-
falls, must be widely disseminated together with 
appropriate countermeasures. 
8-9. Logistical System 
Although the logistical system of the insurgent 
may be rudimentary and primitive, the technical 
intelligence analysts may be required to deal with 
a variety of commodity items for intelligence pur-
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poses (e.g., salt rations, agricultural products, 
primitive drugs, and serums). The capability of 
the insurgent's logistical system to support · sus-
tained military operations may be determined in 
part through technical analysis of commodity 
items. 
8-10. Combined Operations 
a. A major problem of technical intelligence is 
the acquisition of the necessary language skills 
and experience to perform technical analysis and 
evaluation of technical equipment in a foreign 
country. Therefore, combined operations with the 
host country forces are usually imperative. Host 
country military personnel who possess some lim-
ited technical training are· used to assist in over-
coming language and area problems. 
b. Indigenous technical intelUgence personnel 
who are thoroughly familiar with the culture and 
environment of the insurgent are an asset to the 
analysis, evaluation, and collation of certain types 
of technical data and information. For example, 
the habits of guerrillas living in underground tun-
nels may be useful in evaluating and updating 
important technical data. Classrooms, billets, hos-
pitals, and stored materiel may be indicators to 
valuable intelUgence. 
c. Civil affairs units may assist in the acquisi-
tion of necessary, linguistic and technically quali-
fied civilian personnel. In stability operations, 
civilians having technical knowledge may come 
under civil affairs control, especially upon libera-
tion of an area from insurgent control. Their 
evacuation for interrogation purposes may not be 
desirable because of the attitude of the civil popu-
lation at the time. However, the civil population 
may be screened by US or host country civil af-
fairs units or police elements. When civilians hav-
ing technical skills are identified as possible con-
tributors to technical intelligence, they should be 
referred to technical intelligence elements. 
d. Military police, in the course of conducting 
their normal police functions, develop and ex-
change police intelligence with other police agen-
cies in the area of operations. Insurgents, enemy 
agents, and enemy military teams often engage in 
criminal type actions as a means of accomplishing 
their mission. These actions may include murders, 
robberies, black-marketing, riots, counterfeiting 
of currency, and smuggling. Such actions are nor-
mally considered to be violations of civil law. 
'fherefore, the indigenous police are the logical 
forces to engage in the initial investigation of 
these acts. Insurgent property and data of techni-
cal intelligence value may be uncovered during 
such investigations. 
e. Coordination and close liaison with US and 
allied intelligence organizations may result in the 
acquisition of additional information of technical 
intelligence value. A concerted effort should be 
made to establish and maintain friendly and coop-
erative relations with these intelligence organiza-
tions. 
8-11. Strike Operations 
a. An important characteristic of stability oper-
ations is the extensive use of strike operations. 
These offensive operations include encirclement, 
pursuit, raid, sweep, and coordinated attack. 
Strike operations are terminated by withdrawal 
from the operational area upon mission accom-
plishment ; the holding of terrain is not empha-
sized. 
b. Technical intelligence collection teams coordi-
nating with tactical units must emphasize to such 
units that the destruction of potentially valuable 
technical materiel and facilities should, when pos-
sible, be avoided during strike operations. Techni-
cal intelligence personnel must continually brief 
tactical elements on current items wanted lists 
and other items of significant intelligence interest. 
Proper planning, implementation, and dissemina-
tion of the operations order can minimize the loss 
of potential intelligence in all aspects of stability 
operations. 
8-12. Airborne Infantry Ranger Company 
a. The airborne infantry ranger company has a 
limited capability to acquire and exfiltrate small 
portable items of enemy materiel. Technical intel-
ligence requirements, however, should not inter-
fere with primary patrol missions. 
b. Airborne infantry ranger companies of the 
corps or their equivalent command structure will 
have an extensive use for technical intelligence. 
Special technical reports and data should be fur-
nished for special missions. The nature of the 
LRRP (airborne infantry ranger company) mis-
sion may necessitate observation, identification, 
and rep.orting of enemy materiel over a period of 
3 to 5 days. Such missions require as background 
the most current technical information and data. 
Prior to dispatch of the airborne infantry ranger 
company on certain special missions, technical in-
telligence personnel may be requested to provide a 
general technical briefing on foreign materiel that 
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will facilitate accurate identification of enemy 
materiel which may be observed or used by the 
enemy to detect such patrols. 
8-13. Psychological Operations 
a. Psychological operations are widely used in 
an insurgency environment. The discovery of in-
surgent propaganda equipment requires analysis 
by a functional team consisting of supply, chemi-
cal, and equipment personnel to analyze the print-
ing presses, chemicals, inks, and paper being used. 
Such analysis is necessary to assess guerrilla 
methods and determine sources of supply. Com-
munications-electronics specialists can assist 
PSYOP personnel in the analysis of loudspeakers 
and radio broadcasting equipment. 
b. The technical intelligence aspects of operable 
foreign radio_ and television stations and printing 
facilities are important in furthering the field 
army PSYOP capability. Such installations and 
facilities should be turned over to civil affairs, 
PSYOP units, and communications-electronics 
specialists for maximum exploitation. 
c. Radio broadcasting and printing facilities 
can be used to further enhance the overall techni-
cal intelligence effort. Specific items of equipment 
desired can be advertised with an offer of mone-
tary reward to potential defectees. 
8-14. Boobytraps and Mines 
a. Explosive mines and boobytraps are used 
widely by the insurgent for harassment of mili-
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tary operations. It is essential that technical intel-
ligence specialists keep abreast of these munitions 
developments. The employment of explosive ord-
nance materiel must be analyzed on a continuous 
basis. For example, duds can easily be modified 
and used as boobytraps. 
b. The weapons and munitions specialists, in 
coordination with EOD personnel, can provide the 
following principal information when such weap-
ons and tactics are used : 
(1) Fragmentation radii. 
(2) Modifications to boobytraps and mines. 
(3) Construction of locally manufactured 
mines. 
( 4) Principal fuzing systems (pressure, pull, 
chemical). 
(5) Types of munitions (bomb, grenade, ar-
tillery, mortar). 
( 6) Fuze ingredients and structures. 
(7) Modifications to fuzes. 
(8) The use of "commercial devices" or mate-
riel. 
(9) Foreign manufactured items used in 
mines and boobytraps. 
(10) Use of triggering devices (battery or 
blasting machines) . 
(11) Use of chemical time-delay devices. 
(12) Use of large bombs. 
c. Dissemination of technical intelligence con-
cerning boobytraps and mines should include 
countermeasures training data. 
8-5 
FM 30-16 
APPENDIX A 
REFERENCES 
A-1. Army Regulations 
(C) 10-122 
(AR) 
75-14 
75-15 
190-60 
310-25 
310-31 
310-50 
380-series 
381-9 
755-2 
US Army Security Agency (U). 
Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 
Responsibilities and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 
Physical Security Standards for Nuclear Weapons. 
Dictionary of United States Army Terms. 
Management System for Tables of Organization and Equipment. 
Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes. 
Security. 
Army Scientific and Technical Intelligence. 
Disposal of Excess, Surplus, Foreign Excess, Captured, and Unwanted 
Materiel. 
A-2. Army Subiect Schedules (ASubiScd) 
30-46 Technical Intelligence Personnel. 
A-3. Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA Pam) 
310-3 Index of Doctrinal, Training, and Organizational Publications. 
310-4 Military Publications: Index of Technical Manuals Technical Bulletins, 
A-4. Field Manuals (FM) 
3-1 
5-25 
5-30 
CC) 5-31 
8-10 
9-6 
9-14 
9-15 
9-47 
11-40 
19-1 
19-4 
19-40 
19-50 
29-24 
29-30 
30-5 
30-9 
AGO 3!18A 
Supply Manuals (Types 7, 8, and 9), Supply Bulletins, and Lubrication 
Orders. 
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological <CBR) Support. 
Explosives and Demolitions. 
Engineer Intelligence. 
Boobytraps (U). 
Medical Support, Theater of Operations. 
Ammunition Service in the Theater of Operations. 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Service. 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit Operations. 
Special Ammunition Unit Operations. 
Tactical Audio-Visual Doctrine. 
Military Police Support, Army Division and Separate Brigades. 
Military Police Support, Theater of Operations. 
Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees. 
Military Police in Stability Operations. 
General Support Maintenance Battalion. 
Maintenance Battalion and Company Operations in Divisions and Separate 
Brigades. · 
Combat Intelligence. 
Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army. 
A-1 
FM 30-16 
30-10 
30-15 
31-23 
(C) 31-40 
(C) 32-5 
(S) 32-10 
(C) 32-20 
33-1 
33-5 
41-10 
55--8 
100-5 
100-20 
101-5 
Military Geographic Intelligence (Terrain). 
Intelligence Interrogation. 
Stability Operations, US Army Doctrine. 
Tactical Cover and Deception (U). 
Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U). 
USASA in Support of Tactical Operations (U). 
Electronic Warfare (U). 
Psychological Operations-US Army Doctrine. 
Psychological Operations-Techniques and Procedures. 
Civil Affairs Operations. 
Transportation Intelligence. 
Operations of Army Forces in the Field. 
Field Service Regulations-Internal Defense and Development (IDAD). 
Staff Officers' Field Manual; Staff Organization and Procedure. 
A-5. Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) 
A-2 
3-500 
29-139 
30-18 
30-25 
30-34 
30-600 
Chemical Service Organization. 
Collection and Classification Company. 
Military Intelligence Detachment, Corps. 
Military Intellig.ence Battalion, Field Army. 
Military Intelligence Company, Technical Intelligence. 
Military Intelligence Organization. 
AGO 3118A 
FM 30-16 
APPENDIX B 
MAJOR CATEGORIES OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE 
Major categories of technical intelligence interest 
used for planning purposes include: 
B-1. Weapons 
a. Guns, all sizes 
b. Chemical weapons and equipment 
c. Launchers, rocket and pyrotechnic 
d. Camouflage and deception equipment 
e. Miscellaneous weapons 
B-2. Atomic Ordnance 
a. Implosion systems 
b. Gun-type systems 
c. Thermonuclear systems 
d. Fuzing and firing devices 
e. Nuclear components 
f. High explosive charges, propellants, and deto-
nators 
g. Specialized test and handling equipment 
B-3. Fire Control Equipment 
a. Fire control directors 
b. Fire control computing sights and devices 
c. Fire control systems, complete 
d. Optical sighting and ranging equipment 
e. Fire control stabilizing equipment 
f. Fire control transmitting and receiving 
equipment 
g. Aircraft gunnery fire control components 
h. Aircraft bombing fire control components 
i. Fire control sonar equipment 
j. Miscellaneous fire control equipment 
B-4. Ammunition and Explosives 
a. Ammunition for guns, all sizes 
b. Ammunition for mortars 
c. Bombs 
d. Grenades 
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e. Guided missile warheads and explosive compo-
nents 
f. Rockets and rocket ammunition 
g. Landmines 
h. Underwater mines 
i. Military chemical agents 
j. Pyrotechnics 
k. Explosives, solid propellants and explosive 
devices 
l. Military biological agents 
m. Fuzes and primers 
n. Miscellaneous ammunition 
B-5. Guided Missiles 
a. Guided missiles, complete 
b. Guided missile components 
c. Guided missile remote control systems 
d. Launchers, guided missile 
e. Guided missile handling and servicing equip-
ment 
B..-6. Aircraft and Airframe Structural 
Components 
a. Aircraft, fixed wing 
b. Aircraft, vertical takeoff and landing 
c. Aircraft, rotary wing 
d. Air cushion vehicles 
e. Aircraft, lighter than air 
f. Gliders 
g. Drones 
B-7. Aircraft Components and Accessories 
a. Propellers 
b. Landing gear 
c. Wheel and brake systems 
d. Auxiliary fuel tanks 
e. Hydraulic, vacuum, and deicing systems 
f. Air-conditioning, heating, and pressurizing 
equipment 
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g. Aerial delivery equipment 
h. Miscellaneous aircraft accessorl.es and com-
ponents 
B-8. Aircraft Launching, ·Landing, and 
Ground Handling Equipment 
a. Aircraft arresting, barrier, and barricade 
equipment 
b. Aircraft launching equipment 
c. Aircraft ground servicing equipment 
d. Airfield specialized trucks and trailers 
B-9. Space Vehicles 
a. Space vehicles. complete 
b. Components 
c. Remote control systems 
d. Launchers 
e. Handling and servicing equipment 
f. Space survival equipment 
B-1 O. Ships, Small Craft, Pontoons, and 
Floating Docks 
a. Barges and lighters, special purpose 
b. Boats 
c. Dredge!! 
d. Miscellaneous vessels. 
B-11. Ship and Marine Equipment 
a. Deck machinery 
b. Marine hardware and hull items 
c. Buoys 
d. Miscellaneous ship and marine equipment 
B-12. Railway Equipment 
a. Locomotives 
b. Railcars 
c. Right-of-way construction and maintenance 
equipment, railroad 
d. Locomotive and railcar accessories and com-
ponents 
e. Track materials, railroad 
B-13. Motor Vehicle, Trailers, and Cycles 
a. Passenger motor vehicles 
b. Trucks and truck-tractors 
c. Trailers 
d. Motorcycles, motor scooters, and bicycles 
e. Tanks 
f. Self-propelled weapons 
B-2 
g. Armored vehicles 
h. Snow vehicles 
i. Amphibious vehicles 
B-14. Tractors 
a. Tractors, tracked 
b. Tractors, wheeled 
B-15. Vehicular Equipment Components 
a. Cab, body, and frame structural components 
b. Power transmission components 
c. Vehicular brake, steering axle, wheel, and 
track components 
d. Furniture and accessories 
e. Miscellaneous vehicular components 
B-16. Tires and Tubes 
a. Tires and tubes, pneumatic 
b. Tires, solid and cushion 
B-17. E.ngines, Turbines and Components 
a. Engines, gasoline 
b. Engines, diesel 
c. Engines, steam, reciprocating 
d. Engines, steam, turbine 
e. Water turbines and water wheels 
f. Gas turbines and jet engines 
g. Rocket engines and components 
h. Miscellaneous engines and components 
-e-1 a. Engine Accessories 
a. Fuel systems 
b. Electrical systems 
c. Cooling systems 
d. Air and oil filters, strainers, and cleaners 
e. Turbosuperchargers 
f. Miscellaneous engine accessories 
B-19. Mechanical Power Transmission 
Equipment 
a. Torque converters and speed chargers 
b. Gears, pulleys, sprockets, and transmission 
chain 
c. Belting, drive belts, fan belts, and accessories 
d. Miscellaneous power transmission equipment 
B-20. Bearings 
a. Bearings, antifriction, unmounted 
AGO J!118A 
b. Bearings, plain, unmounted 
c. Bearings, mounted 
B-21. Woodworking Machinery and 
Equipment 
a. Sawmill and planing mill machinery 
b. Woodworking machines 
c. Tools and attachments for woodworking 
machinery 
8-22. Metalworking Machinery 
a. Cutting equipment 
b. Finishing equipment 
c. Welding equipment 
d. Forming equipment 
e. Tools, portable 
f. Machine tool accessories 
g. Machine shop sets, kits and outfits 
B-23. Service and Table Equipment 
a. Laundry and dry cleaning equipment 
b. Industrial sewing machines and mobile tex-
tile repair shops 
c. Miscellaneous service and trade equipment 
B-24. Special Industry Machinery 
a. Food products machinery and equipment 
b. Gas generating equipment 
c. Miscellaneous special industry equipment 
B-25. Agricultural Machinery and Equipment 
a. Pest, disease, and frost control equipment 
b. Miscellaneous agricultural machinery and 
equipment 
B-26. Construction, Mining, Excavating, and 
Highway Maintenance Equipment 
a. Earth moving and excavating equipment 
b. Shovels, crane-shovels and cranes 
c. Mining equipment 
d. Road-clearing and cleaning equipment 
e. Truck and tractor attachments for construc-
tion activity 
f. Miscellaneous construction equipment 
B-27. Materials Handling Equipment 
a. Conveyors 
b. Trucks and trailers 
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c. Blocks, tackle, rigging, and slings 
d. Winches, hoists, cranes, and derricks 
e. Elevators and escalators 
f. Miscellaneous materials handling equipment 
B-28. Rope, Cable, Chain, and Fittings 
B-29. Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning 
E.quipmenti 
a. Refrigeration units 
b. Air-conditioning units 
c. Fans and air circulators 
B-30. Fire Fighting, Rescue, and Safety 
Equipment 
a. Fire fighting equipment 
b. Marine lifesaving and diving equipment 
c. Decontaminating and impregnating equip-
ment 
d. Safety and rescue equipment 
B-31. Pumps and Compressors 
B-32. Furnace, Steam Plant, Drying 
Equipment, and Nuclear Reactors 
B-33. Plumbing, Heating and Sanitation 
Equipment 
8-34. Water Purification and Sewage 
Treatment Equipment 
8-35. Pipe, Tubing, Hose and Fittings 
B-36. Valves 
B-37. Maintenance and Repair Shop 
Equipment 
B-38. Handtools 
B-39. Measuring Tools 
B-40. Hardware and Abrasives 
B-41. Prefabricated Structures and 
Scaffolding 
a. Prefabricated and portable buildings 
b. Bridges, fixed and floating 
c. Storage tanks 
d. Miscellaneous prefabricated structures 
8-42. Lumber, Millwork, Plywood and 
Veneer 
B-43. Construction and Building Materials 
FM 30-16 
B-44. Communication Equipment 
a. Telephone and telegraph equipment 
b. Teleprinters and facsimile equipment 
c. Radio and television communication equip-
ment 
d. Radio navigation and direction finders 
e. Intercommunication and public address sys-
tems 
f. Sound recording and reproducing equipment 
g. Radar equipment 
h. Infrared communication equipment 
i. Electronic countermeasures equipment 
B-45. Electrical and Electronic Equipment 
Components 
B-46. Electric Wire, Power, and Distribution 
Equipment 
a. Motors 
b. Generators and generator sets, electrical 
c. Transformers, distribution and power station 
d. Converters 
e. Batteries 
f. Wire and cable, electrical 
B-47. Lighting Fixtures and Lamps 
B-48. Alarm and Signal Systems 
B-49. Medical, Dental, and Veterinary 
Equipment and Supplies 
B-50. Instruments and Laboratory Equipment 
a. Navigational instruments 
b. Measuring and testing instruments 
c. Laboratory equipment and supplies 
d. Optical instruments 
e. Meteorological instruments 
f. Hazard detecting instruments 
g. Drafting, surveying and mapping instru-
ments 
h. Combination and miscellaneous instruments 
B-51. Photographic Equipment 
B-52. Chemicals and Chemical Products 
B-53. Training Aids and Devices 
B-54. Furniture1 
B-55. Food Preparation and Serving 
Equipment 
B-56. Office Machines and Data Processing 
Equipment 
B-57. Books, Maps, and Other Publications 
B-58. Musical Instruments, Phonographs, and 
Home-type Radios 
B-59. Cleaning and Finishing Equipment and 
Supplies 
B-60. Containers, Packaging and Packing 
Supplies 
B-61. Textiles, Leathers and Furs 
a. Fabrics 
b. Tents and tarpaulins 
B-62. Clothing and Individual Equipment 
a. Outerwear 
b. Footwear 
c. Badges and insignia 
d. Individual combat equipment 
e. Personal armor · 
f. Specialized flight clothing and accessories 
B-63. Toiletries 
B-64. Agricultural Supplies 
'B-65. Live Animals and Foodstuffs 
B-66. Fuels, Lubricants, Oils, and Waxes 
B-67. Nonmetallic Fabricated Materials 
B-68. Nonmetallic Crude Materials 
B-69. Metallic Crude Materials 
B-70. Ores, Minetals, and Their Primary 
Products 
B-71. Miscellaneous 
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APPENDIX C 
EXAMPLE OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PLAN 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
Copy No. 
Thirtieth Army 
HEIMERSHEIN, (595120) Germany 
100930 July 19_ 
Appendix ____ to Annex ____ (Intelligence) to Operation Order. 
1. General 
a. References. 
b. Purpose and scope. 
c. Period covered. 
d. Subordinate elements required to support similar plans. 
e. Priorities. 
2. Organization 
a. Intelligence Agencies (at each echelon). 
(1) Organization. 
(2) Functions. 
(3) Subordinate agencies functions. 
(4) Supporting agencies. 
(5) Liaison and coordination. 
b. A subparagraph for each functional area of technical intelligence 
as it relates to paragraph 2c. 
(1) Weapons-munitions. 
(2) Communication-electronics. 
(3) Supply and equipment. 
( 4) Chemical. 
<5) Mobility. 
( 6) Medical. 
c. Each technical intelligence team should know the following: 
(1) Mission. 
theater. 
(2) General organization. 
(3) Functional team structure. 
(4) Allotment of technical intelligence personnel. 
(5) Specific functions and responsibilities. 
(6) Location of collecting points at each echelon. 
(7) Availability of chemical and medical laboratories in the 
3. Personnel 
a. Military policies concerning: 
(1) Responsibilities of capturing unit. 
(2) Handling captured enemy materiel. 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
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(CLASSIFICATION) 
(3) Handling abandoned equipment. 
(4) Handling technical facilities and installations. 
(5) Authority for destruction of captured materiel when 
necessary. 
area. 
(6) Taking custody of enemy materiel from capturing units. 
(7) Technical intelligenee collection team operations in forward 
(8) Preliminary examinations and analysis. 
(9) Reports to be rendered. 
(a) To tactical units. 
(b) To technical intelligence company. 
(10) Coordination and liaison with combat intelligence personnel. 
(11) Equipment evacuation. 
(12) Markings and tags. 
b. Civilian 
(1) Policies concerning civilians in an area of military operations 
having a technical knowledge. 
(2) Limitations on activities of individuals and groups. 
(3) Policies concerning evacuation of civilian personnel. 
(4) Interrogation of civilians having a technical knowledge. 
4. Direction 
a. Important policies governing overall technical intelligence collec-
tion and analysis (trophies, souvenirs, theater policies). 
b. Amplification of items wanted lists. 
c. Special technical intelligence targets. 
d. Policies governing publishing requirements. 
e. Support to be provided by the field army and its subordinate 
support elements (i.e. F ASCOM, general and direct support elements). 
f. Additional support requirements necessary and by whom rendered. 
g. Preparing EEI and other intelligence requirements. 
h. Host country agreement (if applicable). 
5. Collections 
a. Documents 
(1) Procedures.tor collecting technical documents. 
(2) Forwarding and handling of technical documents. 
(3) Responsibilities for translation of technical documents. 
(4) Responsibilities for analysis, evaluation, and dissemination 
of technical data. 
(5) Handling of timely technical data. 
(6) Channels for forwarding. 
b. Prisoners 
(1) Procedures for selecting personnel with technical knowledge. 
(2) Responsibilities of interrogator personnel. 
(3) Technical intelligence cooperation with interrogators and 
other combat intelligence personnel. 
(4) Handling of military personnel with technical knowledge. 
(5) Handling of civilian personnel with technical knowledge. 
(6) Channels for evacuation. 
(7) Ultimate disposition (civilians, defectees). 
(8) Reports to be rendered. 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
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c. Materiel 
(1) Specific unit responsibilities. 
(2) Examination policies. 
(8) Evacuation channels. 
(a) Primary. 
(b) Alternate. 
(4) Destruction policies (authority to determine whether a target 
should be destroyed). 
ti on. 
(5) Policies in regard to significant new equipment. 
(6) Sensitive or classified equipment. 
(7) Safeguarding. 
(8) Marking. 
(9) Ultimate disposition. 
d. Facilities and Installations. 
(1) Procedures for collecting, analyzing, and reporting informa-
(2) Areas of primary overall intelligence and technical intelli-
gence interest. 
(3) Channels for forwarding facilities data. 
(4) Disposition and dissemination of facilities data. 
6. Processing 
a. Records and/ or files required to be maintained. 
b. General policies governing preparation of technical reports. 
(1) Preliminary reports (PRETECHREPS). 
(2) Detailed technical reports (DETECHREPS). 
c. Liaison and coordination between personnel of the technical intel-
ligence company and other intelligence elements concerning evaluation and 
interpretation of technical information. 
7. Dissemination 
a. Scope. 
b. Content. 
c. Editorial assistance. 
d. Types of reports. 
e. Special reports. 
f. Policies governing dissemination. 
8. Functional and Task Force Operations 
a. Theater and/ or theater army policies. 
b. Scope and priorities. 
c. Effort that may be expended on missions. 
d. Additional support sources if needed. 
e. Procedures for collecting and reporting data. 
f. Responsibilities for direction of operations. 
g. Limitations on units and individuals. 
h. Security. 
(CLASSIFICATION) 
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( CLASSIFICAT'ION) 
i. Safeguarding components of intelligence value. 
j. Host country agreement. 
Distribution : C 
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D-1. Agreement 
APPENDIX D 
HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED ENEMY 
EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS1 
(STANAG 2084) 
It is agreed that the NATO Armed Forces are to use the procedure detailed in Part One for the handling 
of captured enemy equipment and associated technical documents and in Part Two for handling captured 
enemy documents. It is further agreed to use the item list of equipment and the description and proce-
dure for these reports in Section II (Part One-Part Six). Nothing in this Agreement is to prejudice 
any national right on the equipment proper. 
D-2. Definitions 
For the purpose of this Agreement, "document" is defined as any recorded information regardless of its 
physical form or characteristics including, but not limited to, all: 
a. Written material, whether hand written, printed or typed. 
b. Painted, drawn or engraved material. 
c. Sound or voice recordings. 
d. Printed photographs and exposed or printed film, still or motion pictures. 
e. Reproductions of the foregoing, by whatever process produced. 
i The following STAN AG is presented in the original English translation. The STANAG reflects the latest approved amendments; only the section, 
part and paragraph numbering has been changed. · 
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PART ONE 
HANDLING OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT AND 
ASSOCIATED TECHNICAL DOCUMENTS 
a. Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE) and Associated Technical Documents. CEE and associated 
technical documents are to be handled for exploitation with the minimum delay through the following 
processing channels. 2 
(1) Preliminary screening and reporting for information of immediate tactical value by national 
units assigned to NATO. 
(2) Secondary screening and complementary reporting by special intelligence support teams <Tech-
nical Intelligence Teams). 
(3) Detailed exploitation by specialists in the rear area. 
b. Technical Intelligence Reports and Documents. The technical intelligence reports and documents 
considered are: 
(1) PreU-minary Technical Reports (PRETECHREP) (submitted by the capturing unit). Section 
II, Part Two. 
(2) Complementary Technical Reports (COMTECHREP) (submitted by Technical Intelligence 
Teams). Section II, Parts Three, Four and Five. 
(3) Detailed Technical Reports (DETECHREP) (submitted by specialists as appropriate). 
(4) Captured Enemy Technical Documents (TECHDOC) (Maintenance Handbooks, Operation 
Manuals, Drawings, etc.). 
c. National Army, Navy and Air Technical Intelligence Teams. National Army, Navy and Air Tech-
nical Intelligence Teams should be provided to carry out the examination of captured enemy equipment 
:for the information of immediate tactical value (where no requirement exists for a permanent Naval 
Technical Intelligence Team, such groups may be set up on an ad hoc basis). They should be in a posi-
tion to: 
(1) Receive at the earliest possible moment any Preliminary Technical Reports. 
(2) Prepare and transmit the results of Complementary Technical Reports. 
(3) Dispatch items of equipment for specialist examination at base or to the captured equipments 
depot (which are to be established at a minimum of one per Army Group). 
( 4) Liaise with prisoner of war (PW) interrogation units. 
( 5) Ensure that new equipment in possession of a PW is examined as soon as interrogation units 
have finished with the items concerned. Full use should be made of voluntary information which the 
PW may give. (See STANAG 2033) 8 
(6) Receive from intelligence channels all copies of technical documents which may assist them in 
their examination. 
d. Technical Intelligence Teams should as far as possible be independent or organic to the units ear-
marked or assigned to NATO and be sufficiently flexible to cater for a variety and number of equip-
ments. They need to be equipped with suitable tools, transport and facilities for compiling and send-
ing their reports from the field. Suggested allocation for these teams is given in Section II, Part Six. 
e. Specialist Team. Specialist Teams are required to carry out the more detailed examination of cap-
tured enemy equipments to supplement the more superficial data which can be obtained in the field. Such 
items should be in a position after their examination to render the Detailed Technical Repor.'-. No sug-
gested allocation is given for these teams as they are dependent on national resources available. 
• A detailed list of the types of CEE to be processed is given in Section II, Part One. 
•Items of equipment taken from the PW to be examined, which according to Article 18 of the 3rd Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, must 
be left with the PW, must be replaced by equivalent items serving the same purpose (see STANAG 2044). 
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D-4. Handling of CEE by Capturing Unit 
a. Units locating enemy equipment of intelligence value are to submit the Preliminary Technical 
Report listed in Section, Part Two. This report is transmitted by the accelerated intelligence reporting 
procedures when it contains intelligence information which could have an immediate effect upon the 
current situation. Reports not containing such information are transmitted by the quickest possible 
means, with the precedence as deermined by the commander initiating the report. These reports con-
tain a general description of the equipment and any technical information of immediate tactical 
importance. 
b. Unit Commanders are responsible for placing the CEE under guard in order to prevent looting, 
misuse or destruction before the arrival of the Technical Intelligence Teams. 
c. Marking of Technical Documents. All technical documents are to be clearly tagged or otherwise 
ident.ified so as to avoid defacing and marked "TECHDOC" by the capturing unit or appropriate agency. 
In the normal exploitation of captured documents, the Command concerned can provide duplicate copies 
for the guidance of all Technical Intelligence and Specialist Teams in their examinations. All such copies 
should accompany captured equipment until technical exploitation is finalized. 
D-5. Handling of CEE by Staffs and Technical Intelligence Teams 
a. The command concerned is to notify the appropriate Technical Intelligence Team, which arranges to 
examine the CEE, either on the spot or nearby where better fi.eld facilities may exist. (See Section II, 
Part Six.) 
b. Having completed the field examination, the relevant parts of the Complementary Report are com-
pleted and sent through normal staff channels. The description of such equipment and any additional 
information of tactical value as can be extracted is sent directly to such headquarters as is specified by 
NATO Authorities. The formats of these reports are given in Section II, Parts Three, Four and Five. 
D-6. Handling of CEE by Specialists 
a. Arrangements should then be made for the speedy evacuation of the equipment to the rear areas 
where suitable facilities exist for a detailed examination of the equipment by specialists. 
b. This enables the completion of a Detailed Technical Report. No illustration is given of this type of 
report in view of the great variety of equipments involved. It should, however, follow the pattern already 
used by national technical exploitation agencies. Such reports are submitted as soon as possible by spe-
cialists through the same channels as those laid down for Complementary Reports. If directed, national 
intelligence agencies should also be informed after either the Complementary or the Detailed Technical 
Reports have been forwarded. 
c. In the case where the capturing nation is not in a position to conduct an exhaustive field or rear area 
exploitation of the equipment, the appropriate NATO Authority advises the capturing nation as to 
further action. In these cases, the exploitation agency should inform the capturing nation of the results 
of that exploitation. 
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PART TWO 
HANDLING AND REPORTING OF CAPTURED .. 
ENEMY DOCUMENT'S 
D-7. General 
a. Captured Enemy Documents (CED). CED, except those belonging to CEE (TECHDOC) or repro-
ductions thereof, are forwarded for exploitation to the appropriate "Captured Document Centre" (CDC). 
These centres are, as a rule, organic to Major NATO Commands. Captured documents are sent with the 
minimum delay through the following processing channels: 
(1) National units assigned to NATO for preliminary screening for information. of immediate tac-
tical value. 
(2) Special intelligence Support Teams for CED for. secondary screening, reproductions and dis-
semination to all concerned. 
(3) CDC for detailed exploitation and indexing. 
b. Categories of CED. CED are to be divided as follows: 
<1) Category "A.'' Category "A" documents are those which contain information concerning sig-
nificant intelligence subjects, such as enemy order of battle, the employment of new weapons, and equip-
ment by the enemy, his logistic situation (stock levels, shortages, supply systems, especially supply 
systems for missiles), his morale, his losses, etc. Such documents require immediate operational exploita-
tion, and the originals or microfilm copies must reach appropriate operational intelligence staffs at the 
earliest possible moment. 
(2) Category "B." Category "B" documents are cryptographic documents, all encrypted items and 
all documents relating to enemy radio systems. These.documents must reach the appropriate intelligence 
staffs ,at the earliest possible moment. 
(3) Category "C." Category "C" documents are those of lesser intelligence value. 
( 4) Category "D/' Category "D" documents are those which contain no information of intelligence 
value. 
D-8. Handling of Captured Documents by the Capturing Unit 
a, Captured documents must be forwarded without delay by the capturing unit to the staff under 
which the unit is operating, with details of the date, time and place of capture (with map coordinates), 
together with the name of the capturing unit and the circumstances under which the documents were 
found. 
b. Marking of CED. Documents are to be clearly tagged, or otherwise identified so as to avoid defac-
ing, by the capturing unit in the following way: · 
(1) Identification L~tters. Documents are to be ta:gged showing the nationality of the capturing force 
by the national identifying letters prescribed in STANAG 1059. 
(2) Designation of Capturing Units. This' is to include the service to which the unit belOngs. 
(3) Serial Number. Units are to give each document a serial number and should record the dis-
patch of the document in a war diary. 
(4) Date-Time of capture. 
(5) Place of capture (with map coordinates) . 
. (6) Summary of circumstances under which the document was found. 
c. ·In cases where documents are discovered by personnel of NATO staffs and units, and not by national 
forces assigned to or earmarked for NATO, then the identification letters to be used are ''NA.'' Other 
instructions in b above, however, apply. 
d. Whenever intelligence derived from a captured document is included in a unit or information intel-
ligence report, the identification letters and number of the document concerned are to be quoted to avoid 
subsequent false confirmation. 
D-9. Handling of CED by Intelligence Staffs and Special 
Intelligence Support Teams 
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a. AU captured documents must be categorized and forwarded. The detailed procedures for handling 
captured documents include the following main tasks: 
(1) Screening. 
(2) Recording. 
(3) Translation. 
(4) Reproduction. 
(5) Dissemination. 
b. Intelligence staffs must ensure that there is no delny in the exploitation of captured documents. If 
for any reason, qualified personnel or microfilming facilities are temporarily not available or are insuffi-
cient to handle the volume or type of documents concerned, the documents are to be forwarded immedi-
ately to the next higher echelon and are not to be retained by the staff in question. 
c. Methods of Handling Documents. The staff concerned are to handle the documents in one of the fol-
lowing ways: 
(1) Category "A." 
(a) Where microfilming facilities exist, they are to photograph documents with attached com-
ments, and forward original documents direct to either the national agency or the appropriate NA TO 
Intelligenc·e Support Unit for exploitation, by-passing intermediate headquarters. Where suitable lin-
guists are available, microfilms are to be examined for information of tactical value to local commanders. 
(b) Where microfilming facilities do not exist, but suitable linguists are available, they are to 
examine documents for information of tactical value to local commanders, attach appropriate com-
ments, and forward without delay ·to the appropriate higher headquarters. 
( c) Where linguists are not available within the formation headquarters, the documents should go 
to the PW interrogators for evaluation. 
(d) If the marked document is a map or chart, the nearest geographic staff, survey units or topo-
graphical section is to be informed of its existence, giving its scale and series, edition identification and 
date, if possible: 
(2) Category "B." Thes·e are to be forwarded without delay to the Naval, Army, or Air Force 
Headquarters whic]vare primarily interested. The NATO International Headquarters under which the 
capturing unit operates should be informed of the capture and disposition of important documents in this 
category as soon as possible. · 
(3) Cate.gory "C." The staff concerned are to forward Category "C" documents direct to the appro-
priate NATO Int.elligence Support Unit for exploitation. Exceptions to this procedure include: 
(a) Unmarked maps and charts and their source materials (e.g., geodetical and geophysical data 
and air photographs after interpretation) which are to be forwarded through the normal channels to the 
nearest geographic staff, survey unit or topographical section responsible for the areas concerned. Addi-
tional copies may be retained to meet operational needs if necessary. 
(b) Personal mail and paybooks taken from a PW, which are to be returned to the PW after 
exploitation by interrogation personnel or intelligence staffs. 
(c) Other documents acquired from a PW which, after they have served their purpose in inter-
rogation, are to be forwarded to the appropriate intelligence staffs for further exploitation. 
( d) Documents specifically related to equipment which, if of intelligence value, are to accompany 
the equipment to the intelligence agency responsible for exploitation and then sent without delay to the 
CDC. . 
(4) Category "D." Captured documents are not to become final as Category "D" until they have 
been thoroughly scrutinized by document translation specialists at the highest command ·echelon inter-
ested, preferably at least two levels above division. Category "D" documents are to be disposed of as 
directed by appropriate authority. 
d. Documents of the Categories "A," "B," "C" and "D'' captured from crashed enemy aircraft or, in 
particular, related to enemy antiaircraft defense or enemy control and reporting systems, are to be trans-
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mitted t(} the nearest air force headquarters without delay. The same procedure applies to all captured 
maps and charts of enemy air forces. After evaluation by the responsible air force intelligence staff 
they are to be transmitted to the topographical or other appropriate unit. Documents taken from a ship, 
including Category "B" code books, call signs, frequency tables, identification symbols, etc., should be 
forwarded without delay to the nearest naval force headquarters. 
e. As a general rule, Maintenance Handbooks, Operation Manuals and drawings should accompany the 
captured equipment until the intelligence exploitation is completed. 
D-10. Handling of CED by CDC 
a. Lists of documents which have been exploitated are to be distributed to all intelligence staffs by the 
CDC to avoid duplication in translating and processing identical documents by different units. A master 
list of all captured documents which have been exploited in NATO commands is to be maintained. , 
b. When action on captured documents at CDC has been completed, the original documents are sent to 
the national staff whose forces captured them. 
D-11. Implementation of the Agreement 
This STAN AG will be considered to have been implemented when the necessary orders/instructions put-
ting the procedures detailed in this Agreement into effect have been issued to the_ forces concerned. 
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Section II. ANNEXES TO STANAG 2084 
PART ONE. TYPES OF CAPTURED ENEMY EQUIPMENT 
D-12. Equipment 
Types of enemy equipment to be collected and examined by Technical Intelligence Teams. (New equip-
ment or equipment in the process of development {"significant equipment") are the main concern of 
these teams.) 4 
D-13. Armr Equipment 
a. Guided missiles. 
b. Ammunition, all types including mines demolitions, pyrotechnics, and 
chemicals 
c. Infantry weapons 
d. Sabotage equipment 
e. Armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) 
f. Military vehicles excluding AFVs 
g. Artillery, including antitank, antiaircraft and field rocket weapons 
h. Guided missile launching systems 
i. Engineering, amphibious and river crossing equipment 
j. Electronics, infra-red detection and communication equipment 
k. Airborne equipment 
l. Special weapons, including nuclear, biological and chemical warfare 
equipment, flame and incendiary weapons, equipment for dispersion of 
chemical and biological warfare agents, together with protective devices 
m. Miscellaneous equipments: 
( 1) Camouflage equipment 
(2) Clothing and personal equipment 
(3) Medical equipment 
(4) Rations 
D-14. Air Force Equipment 
a. Aircraft, airframe and power plant 
b. Airborne armament and ammunition, bomb sights, gun sights and 
photographic and other sensors and associated equipment 
c. Airborne communications-electronics equipment 
d. Airborne sea mine countermeasures 
e. Miscellaneous airborne equipment, including instruments and con-
trols, dinghies, parachute and other safety equipment 
f. Ground equipment and installations 
g. Fuels, lubricants, greases and propellants 
h. Guided missiles and associated equipment 
i. Equipment for dispersion of chemical and biological warfare agents 
j. Miscellaneous equipments: 
(1) Flying clothing equipment, including G-suits, pressure breathing 
equipment etc. 
(2) Medical equipments and flying rations 
} 
TYPE B 
See Part Four 
TYPE C 
See Part Five 
TYPE A 
See Part Three 
• Although cryptographical material is not specifically mentioned in the above lists, technical intelligence teams also are responsible :f'or the collec-
tion of such material. Special instructions for the handling of this equipment are to be issued by the appropriate NAT'() Command. 
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D-15. Navy Equipment5 
a. Ships. 
b. Missiles and launching systems. 
c. Shipboard ordnance, including guns, fire control equipment, i.e., radar, range finders, stable ele-
ments, range keepers, spotters' telescopes, gun mounts and turrets, ammunition hoists, rammers, fuses, 
fuse setters, recoil mechanisms, ammunition, ammunition stowage facilities; ahead thrown weapons of 
all types, including Hedgehogs, Mousetraps, Weapon "A" equivalents, Limbo types, depth charge racks 
and "Y" and "K" gun launchers; torpedoes and torpedo tubes, including Anti-submarine Warfare 
(ASW) launchers; rockets and rocket launchers. 
a.. Sea mines (all types, including moored, bottom and floating; contact and influence). 
e. Mine Countermeasures. 
f. Harbour defence equipment, including nets, booms, alerting devices, net tenders and ASDICS. 
g. Navy electronics, infra-red, detection and communication equipment, sonars, fathometers and son-
obuoys. 
h. Fuels, lubricants, greases and propellants. 
i. Special weapons, including chemical warfare equipment, flame and incendiary equipment for dis-
persion of chemical and biological warfare agents, together with protective devices such as clothing, 
gas masks and canisters; salt water spray deck washing equipment for AER protection. 
j. Medical supplies and medical instruments. 
k. Demolition and sabotage equipment, UDT equipment (sleds, masks, etc.). 
l. Naval engineering systems, including main propulsion machinery, steam or gas turbines, boilers, 
diesel engines, auxiliary equipment including motor generators, heat exchanges, pumps, evaporators, fuel 
oil systems for boilers and diesel engines including fuel pumps and fuel oil heaters; pressure gauges, 
boiler accessories including safety valves, propellors, hull zincs, refrigerating machinery, submarine stor-
age batteries and their ventilating equipment, amm Jters, voltmeters, amp/hr meters; steering engines, 
engine room telegraph systems, submerged atmospheric gas analyzers, C02 scrubbers, compressors, and 
ship's underwater logs; samples of metals used in shipbuilding and any information (description) of 
welding techniques used in shipbuilding. 
m. Hydrofoil and hovercraft, small boats and boat handling equipment, life rafts and signal apparatus 
or any of their components such as hydrofoil foils. 
n. Anchors, chains, windlasses, winches, fuelling and transfer at sea rigs, and cargo handling gear. 
o. Hydrographic survey ship's equipment, including high altitude research rockets and their launch-
ing equipment, sonars and fathometers, sea bottom sampling gear such as drags and coring equipment, 
deep sea anchors, sea current measuring devices, biological sampling equipment, Nansen bottles, possible 
helicopters and other equipment such as laboratory instruments. 
5 Where no requirement exists for permanent Naval Technical Intelligence Teams, such groups may be set up on an ad hoc basis. 
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PART TWO. PRETECHREP 
D-16. Procedures 
To be submitted by accelerated intelligence reporting procedures immediately following the acquisition 
of significant enemy equipment (see paragraph D-4a). 
a. Date found, location (map reference). 
b. Type of equipment and quantity. 
e. Origin. 
d. Brief description with distinguishing marks. 
e. Technical characteristics with an immediate value. 
f. Signature of the commander of capturing unit. 
g. Time and origin of the message. 
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PART THREE. COMTECHREP-TYPE A 
D-17. Data 
To be submitted by the fastest available means immediately following initial examination of enemy air-
craft. 
a. Date and location of crash and map of reference. 
b. Type of aircraft and: 
( 1) Overall length. 
(2) Overall wing-span. 
c. Identification and distinguishing marks. 
d. Type of engine(s) and condition. 
e. Cause of crash; number, location and calibre of projectile strikes; condition of aircraft. 
f. Armament: 
(1) Guns of all types, installation positions, quantity. 
(2) Ammunition and number of magazines. 
(3) Bombs and bomb installations. 
( 4) Mines and mine carriers. 
( 5) Rocket projectiles and carriers. 
(6) Pyrotechnics, number and type. 
g. Armour-plate: quantity, positions, thickness, strikes, penetration. 
h. Number of crew and fate. 
i. Wings and control surfaces: leading edge, if protected against balloon cables by cutters, strength-
ening or other special devices; de-icing. 
j. State if samples are obtainable of: 
(1) Gasoline. 
(2) Oil. 
( 3) Coolant. 
(4) Hydraulic fluids. 
( 5) Deicing fluids. 
k. Internal equipment: state condition and whether bombsights, radio, photographic and other sensors 
and associated equipment and electronics equipment and instruments are standard. If not, specify modi-
fications, alterations or omissions. Obtain radio frequency setting, if possible. 
l. Landing gear: type and condition. 
m. General remarks and special points or unusual features not mentioned. 
n. Name plates photographed: 
( 1) Airframe. 
(2) Engine. 
(3) Others. 
o. Other information. 
p. Name of officer in command of Technical Intelligence Team making examination. 
q. Time and origin of msesage. 
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PART FOUR. COMTECHREP-TYPE B 
D-18. Ammunition 
COMTECHREP TYPE B is used for reporting information about ammunition; missiles, bombs, shells, 
rockets, projectiles, mines, torpedoes, etc. To be submitted by the fastest available means immediately 
following initial examination. Only use those letters for which information is available. 
a. Nationality, designation and mark number. 
b. Description. · 
c. Overall length of missile, includir.:g fuze, tail, vanes and fittings. 
d. Maximum diameter of missiles. 
e. Shape and design of missiles (streamlining shells). 
f. Length and width of tail. 
g. Span of vanes. 
h. Thickness of casing at nose. 
i. Thickness of casing at sides. 
:i. Thickness of casing at base. 
k. Material of body. 
l. Material of tail or vanes. 
1n. Colour and marking of body. 
n. Colour and marking of nose. 
o. Colour and marking of tail or vanes. 
p. Weight and nature of main filling. 
q. Total weight of missile. 
r. Method of suspension. 
s. Detonation system. 
t. Fusing systems and markings. 
u. Antihandling or boobytra·p devices. 
v. Method of propulsion. 
w. Date and location of missile. 
x. Other information. 
y. Name of officer in command of the Technical Intelligence Team making examination. 
z. Time and origin of message. 
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PART FIVE. COMTECHREP-TYPE C 
D-19. Description of Captured Equipment 
To be submitted with 72 hours following the acquisition of an item of captured equipment not covered 
under Types A and B. 
a. Date found, location (map reference). 
b. Type of equipment and quantity. 
c. Origin. 
d. Description with distinguishing marks (additional details). 
e. Conditions of equipment. 
f. Technical characteristics of immediate tactical 
value (additional details). 
g. Recommended disposal. 
h. Name plates photographed. 
i. Photographs taken. 
j. Other information. 
k. Name of team chief. 
l. Time and origin of message. 
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PART SIX. TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE TEAMS 
D-20. NATO Forces 
Army and Air teams should be provided by national forces assigned to NATO to the extent deemed neces-
sary and preferably on the following minimum basis. 
a. Where forces concerned are operating on one front or on a peninsula (Norway, Denmark, Italy, 
Greece) : two army and two air teams. 
b. Where forces concerned are operating on two fronts on, a peninsula (Turkey): two army and two 
air teams per front. 
D-21. Naval Teams 
See paragraph D-3c regarding naval teams. 
D-22. Composition 
It is recognized that as these teams are to be furnished on a national basis, their composition will be 
partly determined by national characteristics. However, the following composition of army and air teams 
is suggested as a standard in order to give adequate technical intelligence support to the fighting forces: 
a. AirTeam 
<l) Airframe-engine equipment. 
(2) Armament. 
( 3) Communications-electronics. 
( 4) Administrative-photos, reports, transport and equipment. 
(5) Guided missile ordnance. 
b. ArmyTeam 
( 1) Vehicles, tanks. 
(2) Engineering equipment. 
<3) Armament. 
( 4) Radio .. electronics. 
(5) Guided missile ordnance. 
(6) Administrative. 
(7) Nuclear-biological-chemical specialist. 
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APPENDIX E 
NOMENCLATURE FOR SOVIET BLOC ARMY WEAPONS 
AND EQUIPMENT1 
(STANAG 2097) 
Section I. DETAILS OF AGREEMENT 
E-1. Agreement 
The NATO Armed Forces agree to use the nomenclature of the nation of 
origin for Soviet Bloc Army weapons, equipment and vehicles whenever 
this nomenclature is known. 
E-2. Descriptive Titles 
a. When the nomenclature of the nation of origin is NOT known a short 
descriptive title is to be devised and used as an interim measure only. 
b. These short interim titles are to be issued by SHAPE as soon a.s 
possible after the sighting details have been received from national/NATO 
sources. When reporting new items to SHAPE national/NATO sources 
should suggest a possible interim title, formulated as detailed in the sub-
sequent paragraphs. Interim titles should: 
(1) Include the nation of design and manufacture (where this is 
different from the nation of design) or the best intelligence estimate 
thereof. 
(2) Include a question mark after the national name when appropriate. 
(3) Become progressively more specific, e.g. 
(a) E. German ( ?) Hand Grenade M 1960. 
(b) E. German copy of Sov Hand Gr-enade M 1960. 
(c) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand Grenade M 1960. 
(d) E. German copy of Sov HEAT Hand Grenade A. KG-3. 
E-3. Protection of Sources 
When the manner in which information was obtained clearly warrants pro-
tection of a confidential source or method, the NATO nation providing the 
information is to assign a security classification which .remains binding 
on all recipients until the classification is removed by the originating 
authority. 
E-4. Description 
The nomenclature for any given piece of equipment is to include an ade-
quate description to show the: 
a. Role of the equipment, e.g. medium tank, howitzer, antitank gun. 
b. Type of chassis where applicable, e.g. half tracked, tracked or wheeled 
including types of wheel arrangement. 
1 The following STANAG is presented in the original English translation. The STANAG reflects the latest 
approved amendments; only the section, part and paragraph numbering has been changed, 
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Type of equipment 
Small arms 
E-5. Weapon Calibers 
a. The calibre of all weapons are to be referred to in millimeters and 
always placed immediately preceding the description of the weapon or 
figures indicating the year of sighting. 
b. The abbreviation mm for millimeters is always to be used. 
E-6. Date of First Sighting or Evidence of Existence 
a. The year when the equipment was first seen or known to exist is to be 
indicated by the use of the letter Mand the four figures of the year. These 
figures become part of the title, e.g. 100 mm Field Gun M 1964. 
b. It is possible that more than one new equipment of a similar type 
may be sighted in any one year. To distinguish between the various types a 
numerical suffix is to be applied to the sighting date, e.g. M 1962/1, 
M 1962/2, M 1962/3. 
E-7. Examples of Titles 
The items to be included in the title of each group of weapons and equip-
ment, and examples of these titles, are shown in Section II. 
E-8. Implementation of the Agreement 
This STAN AG will be considered to have been implemented when the neces-
sary orders/instructions have been issued directing the forces concerned 
to put the content of this Agreement into effect. 
Section II. TITLES OF GROUPS OF WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT 
NATION OF ORIGIN-
Items in title Examples 
Caliber 7.62mm Pistol M 1964 
Infantry antiaircraft (AA) weapons Description 12. 7mm AA Machine Gun M 1963 
Infantry antitank (AT) weapons Sighting year 82mm AT Launcher M 1964 
Hand grenades ---------------------- If antitank (AT) Hand Grenade M 1964 
Sighting year AT Hand Grenade M 1964 
Artillery --------------------------- Caliber lOOmm Field Gun M 1964 
Description 152mm SP Gun M 1965 
If self-propelled (SP) 
Sighting year 
Rocket launchers -------------------- Caliber 240mm Rocket Launcher 
Description (16-round) M 1964 
Number of rounds One Round Rocket Launcher M 1964 
Sighting year 
Tanks ------------------------------ Weight class Medium Tank M 1964 
If amphibious Light Amphibious Tank 1964 
Sighting year 
Armoured Personnel Carrier _________ If amphibious APCM1964 
If tracked or half-tracked Amphibious Tracked APC M 1964 
Sighting year 
Assault guns (SU's) ----------------- Description SU-100 M 1964 
Caliber (without mm) 
Sighting year 
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NATION OF ORIGIN......:. 
Type of equipment Items in title Examples 
Soft skinned vehicles including wheeled If amphibious Truck, 4x2, M 1964 
ainphibians ----------------------- If tracked Ainphibious Truck, 4x4, M 1965 
Description Tracked Amphibian M 1964 
Type of drive (wheels) 
Sighting year 
Engineer equipment -------,----------- Description Trencher M 19?4 
Sighting year Ponton M 1964 
' 
Radars ----------------------------- Description and type Tactical Control SAM Radar M 1964 
Sighting year Surveillance Field Radar M 1964 
Fire Control Antiaircraft Radar M 1964 
Guided Inissile/free rocket ----------- Role FROG 1964 
Sighting year SCUD1964 
(also use STANAG 3236 when applica-
ble) 
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Analysis -----------------------
Arms, insurgent use of _________ _ 
Arms caches ---------------------
Army Materiel Command (AMC)_ 
Army Security Agency (ASA) 
Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Intelligence (ACSI) 
Functions and responsibilities_ 
Booby traps --------------------
Chemical, biological, and radio-
logical (CBR) technical 
intelligence 
Capabilities ----------------
Objectives _________ ---------
Chief of engineers _______________ _ 
Civil affairs units 
Nature ----------------------
In combined operations _____ _ 
Sources -------------~------
Collecting points _______________ _ 
Collection -----------------------
Collection agencies 
Definition ·------- -----------
L~t -----------------------
Collection teams 
Augmentation __ -------------
Corps echelon ______________ _ 
Combat service support role _____ _ 
Combat troops __________ ----~----
Combined Operations ___________ _ 
Communica·tfons-eleetronics 
intelligence 
Equipment intelligence 
production _______________ _ 
Objectives ------------------
Specialists -----------------
Complemenatry technical report 
( CO_MTECHREP) ___________ _ 
Coordination --------------------
Corps technical intelligence 
collection team ------------ ---
Counterintelligence _____________ _ 
Deduction ----------------------
Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA) -----------------------
Detailed technical report 
(DETECHREP) ---------------
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Evacuation methods -------------
Evaluation 
Definition ------------------
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Explosive ordnance 
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Recovery and evaluation ___ _ 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD) Units ------------------
Foreign ammunition ------------
Foreign materiel ---------------
Foreign Service and Technology 
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General supply and equipment 
intelligence 
Capabilities ----------------
Objectives ------------------
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Insurgent warfare _ -------------
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Intelligence 
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Interpretation 
Analysis --------------------
Elements -------------------
Deduction __ ----------------
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Interrogation -----------------~­
Investigative data --------------
Items wanted list (IWL) --------
Library, technical reference _____ _ 
Logistical system ---------------
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Medical intelligence 
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